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Near East/South Asia Report

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EGYPT

COMMUNIST FIGURE ANALYZES OPPOSITION

Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 30 May 86 pp 5, 11

[Interview with Egyptian Communist Party Politburo Member Michel Kamil: "The Egyptian Opposition, Between Theory and Practice;" place and date not specified]

[Text] Comrade Michel Kamil, member of the Egyptian Communist Party's Politburo, is vastly experienced, being one of those progressive Egyptian strugglers who have carried on their "revolutionary struggle" ever since the Fifties. Along with other eminent figures, he unhesitatingly paid the price of the struggle in gloomy prisons, underwent the worst kinds of torture, and willingly suffered exile in carrying out his mission.

This interview with Michel Kamil is particularly important in the local, Arab and international context because it is so open. It basically concentrates on the Egyptian opposition's theoretical and practical situation and on the heated incidents taking place in Egypt, particularly the uprising by the central security forces, the murder of Sulayman Khatir, the workers' strikes, the extension of the emergency law, the Egyptian regime's attempt to get out of its predicament by Arabizing Camp David, and the growing tendency towards subservience towards imperialism and Zionism, in addition to American and Zionist threats against resolute Syria and aggression against Libya. In the interview, which lasted more than 2 hours, Kamil diagnosed the crisis and outlined various outlets and objective alternatives. Here we give you the interview word for word, without any retouching.

The Difference Between the Opposition and the Masses

[Question] How would you compare the Egyptian opposition's theoretical and practical situation to the spontaneous mass resurgence taking place in Egypt recently?

[Answer] It is true that we are experiencing a certain dissimilarity and contradiction, as manifested in the "resurgence" of the mass movement in Egypt (even though it has spontaneous features), along with the official opposition forces' "backsliding" to join, and even forge an alliance with, this

mass movement. There is increasing isolation and schism between the leaders of the Egyptian opposition and the mass movement, something which involves not only us but also pertains to the various opposition forces and their rapprochement with the middle class cadres and the backbone of the Egyptian national opposition. This schism exists not only between the opposition parties and the masses, but also between these parties' leaders and their own cadres and supporters, to the point where these leaders themselves have been forced to resolve this situation. We have noticed that the latest political report by the NPU contained phrases which demonstrated a critical overview of NPU policies and practices, as well as clear references to the political opposition forces' "lagging behind" the street movement--this was literally the expression used. The report also said "the mass movement has transcended any so-called class or political group." However, these preliminaries did not go so far as to present the hoped-for sound solutions. The report contented itself with responding to the situation I mentioned before and proposing the slogan "deferring to the masses." As we see it, this is merely a mechanical solution, not a scientific one, and raises an important question as to the meaning of "deferring to the masses," as well as the nature of the political and imperative stands proposed to the masses and the forms of struggle on the basis of which the masses have been mobilized--i.e., the "political and social content" of what is called "deferring to the masses."

Raising this slogan, which has no real content, has certainly not led to any positive results. In the period which followed the awakening and revival of the mass movement, we saw no deferring to the masses; rather, we saw an attempt to pacify them and restrain their activity for various reasons. As proof, we might mention some examples of "intimidation of the masses." As a consequence of this mass movement, the Egyptian regime reacted by cutting back on the limited, controlled number of freedoms and by scaring people with the spectre of a "military coup" or a coup by fanatic Egyptian religious groups. As the mass movement advanced, we could sense an increasingly threatening pitch in al-Sadat's speeches, as a reaction to the accelerating deterioration of living conditions and the regime's subjugation to American-Zionist insolence.

The Conspiratorial Call to Save the Nation

[Question] Some Egyptian opposition forces have recently stressed the need for "unity and alliance of all parties," on the pretext of saving both the nation and the opposition, and for guiding the Mubarak regime and bringing it to its senses. How would you analyze these appeals?

[Answer] Following up and evaluating the policies and justifications of the Egyptian opposition forces has led us to serious conclusions, since we are now seeing a fundamental contradiction on the Egyptian scene--impetuosity and hastiness in the political stands taken by this opposition, which is heading towards an understanding and accord with the Egyptian regime and the various Egyptian parties regardless of their class representation and political tendencies. In other words, the opposition is calling for an indiscriminant "unity of all Egyptian parties" and for "saving the nation" from the economic crisis, operating from an "idealistic" point of view which imagines that this crisis was aggravated by the outbreak of

the crisis in Egyptian authority, which culminated in the "revolt" by the central security forces. The opposition is making this claim on the pretext that this would guarantee that the more sensible capitalist forces and currents would return to their senses and support and promote the reformist tendencies in order to protect the stability of the Egyptian regime itself from internal erosion. Thus these opposition forces gave wide dissemination to the slogans "national agreement" and "democratic accord," and invited all the Egyptian parties, including the ruling NPU, to take part in this model "alliance" in order to confront the dangers which threatened everyone, authorities and opposition alike, and which therefore, in their view, threatened to sweep them all away.

However, on the other hand, the events of the past 3 months have proven that the regime was too hasty in taking steps and following policies which were totally contradictory to those flights of fancy presented by the opposition. Police repression against the legitimate struggle of the working class and the masses has increased in ferocity, more arrests are being made, and crimes of brutal torture have become everyday practice. Just as happened during the January 1977 experiment, al-Sadat's subsequent push towards total commitment to imperialism, his taking refuge with Israel, and the signing of the Camp David agreement, we find this same experience being repeated with the Mubarak regime's forceful rush towards protecting itself, and we therefore see many repressive measures, such as the following.

For the first time, an American nuclear aircraft carrier, accompanied by five battleships, was permitted to pass through the Suez Canal into the Mediterranean; this potentially polluting passage was part of the American plans for aggression against Syria and Libya. Furthermore, the Egyptian regime has stepped up its hostile, squalid propaganda campaigns against the remaining citadels of the Arab nationalist movement. Egyptian Foreign Minister 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid has issued statements supporting the results of the Tokyo conference of the seven industrial nations, particularly those concerning "alleged terrorism." The Egyptian regime's sale to Israel of Egyptian weaponry, including 60 French Gazelle planes assembled in Egypt, has been revealed; most of these weapons, except for the planes, have been sent on to South Africa. The Egyptian regime does not deny this fact, justifying it on the grounds that these weapons were sold and sent to Israel, and not to South Africa, as if dealing with the racist Zionist state so close to our borders and so immediately threatening is more excusable than dealing with South Africa.

In addition, recently leaked reports indicate that negotiations are in progress between the Egyptian regime and the American administration over granting "military bases" in Sinai and on the Libyan borders, in return for financial compensation in the form of "rent", on the pretext of alleviating the military debt and interest burden so as to try to solve the economic crisis.

Spreading Camp David Throughout the Arab World

[Question] In your opinion, what role has been "assigned" to the Mubarak regime to facilitate American and Zionist aggression against the Arab world?

[Answer] The Egyptian regime's role in American aggression against the region is no secret. The regime carries out its assigned role covertly, to a certain extent, fearing the reaction of the Egyptian popular masses. Even so, at this time, the part which President Husni Mubarak is playing in reviving the 'Amman agreement, attempting to propagate the Camp David agreements on the official Arab level, and providing the "Zionized Phalangist Lebanese forces" with weapons, has become clear and well-known. Just recently it was officially announced that an Egyptian ship carrying large quantities of Egyptian weapons had arrived at the Lebanese port of Juniyah.

The National Economy Cannot Be Built With Subsidies and Subservience

[Question] Mubarak and Peres called on the recent seven-member Tokyo Summit to adopt a Marshall Plan. What is your opinion of this? Why are some Egyptian opposition forces calling for saving the Egyptian national economy?

[Answer] All these delusions of "guidance" proposed by some Egyptian opposition forces have collapsed under the pressure of the regime's recent measures furthering Egypt's subservience. The extent of the Mubarak regime's submissiveness and deference to various International Monetary Fund conditions, far exceeding al-Sadat's subservience and treachery, has been exposed.

Mubarak submitted a Marshall Plan for saving the Egyptian economy to the recent Tokyo summit of the seven industrial nations. At the same time, Perez presented a similar plan for saving Egypt, Israel and Jordan. These two plans are obviously connected, especially since Egyptian Economy Minister Sultan Abu-'Ali and NPU Deputy Secretary General Mustafa Khalil obviously worked together to draw up and draft the Israeli proposal.

The other measure which endangers economic and social conditions in Egypt and runs completely contrary to the aspirations and dreams of the "accordist" opposition forces is exemplified by the Egyptian supply minister's infamous, momentous decision to grant more foreign concessions and more capital in the form of new tax and customs exemptions, some of which have taken effect. The same thing holds for tourism projects for the next 30 to 40 years.

At the same time, the Egyptian regime has permitted the private sector to import goods without converting hard currency, particularly foodstuffs and consumer goods like wheat and sorghum, the importation of which had been the monopoly of the public sector. More than 3 billion Egyptian pounds' worth of such goods are imported each year. This measure will lead to higher prices for the Egyptian popular masses and will constitute an increasingly unbearable burden on the greater majority of the people, who basically suffer poverty and destitution, while realizing huge gains and profits for the capitalists.

The Egyptian regime's openness measures have directly resulted in a roughly 35 percent drop in the price of the Egyptian pound over the past few months, which means that the national economy is truly being plundered. These measures have also caused an immediate rise in the foreign debt to the tune of 7 billion pounds..

Conversely, the burden on the popular masses is getting heavier, for they are forced to pay the difference between the official price and the black market price when buying the foodstuffs they need.

Alleged Democracy and Repressive Measures

[Question] The Mubarak regime is using its information media to emphasize freedom of the press and the democratic life, while stepping up its threats and repression against national forces. What do you think of that, especially now that the emergency law has been extended?

[Answer] As for the democracy which the regime is claiming and using as the main excuse for every step backward, the regime has maintained a democratic facade and is staying within narrow boundaries. We are referring to freedom of the press and information. Even though the regime is bragging about this, everyone can see that the regime's agencies have stepped up their vicious repression of the popular masses and their democratic freedoms. For more than 1,205 defendants out of an original 1,560 to be brought to trial in the central security case is unprecedented in the entire history of Egypt. Those 1,205 defendants were charged with crimes punishable by execution, which is obviously contradictory to this alleged democracy. Such repression took on its most brutal form with the horrible slaughter of thousands of central security force enlisted men. It was surrounded with secrecy and circumspection, but the masses learned the truth about this dreadful massacre, with the immediate result that the so-called Egyptian People's Assembly passed a law extending the emergency rulings for 2 more years.

In spite of the harshness, viciousness and savagery of these repressive acts, the mass movement which rejects the regime and its policies has continued to exist and has not been deterred. The massacre of the central security forces was immediately followed by a strike by 1,000 workers at the sugar plant. The Egyptian authorities stormed the plant with armored vehicles and arrested more than 500 workers, who are still being detained and are suffering the worst kinds of torture. The arrests have swelled to include thousands of students and intellectuals, and the security agencies have desecrated the sanctity of the universities and al-Azhar.

On 25 May 1986, the Egyptian State Security Court issued unjust rulings in the Egyptian Communist Party case involving both Communist and democratic elements, handing down unfair sentences in the case of 35 strugglers. We can only conclude that the delusions of firm guidance and wise advice harbored by those opposition figures who support the Egyptian regime's mentality have had no positive result; in fact, the exact opposite has happened.

The Middle-Class Cadres Disagree With Their Leaders

[Question] It is said that some middle-class opposition cadres in Egypt disagree with their traditional leaders, and are becoming more revolutionary. Is this true? How much mass influence do they have?

[Answer] We make no distinction between official and secret Egyptian opposition forces. Our party has a clear stand vis-a-vis those opposition forces. We do not condemn the whole movement or the official opposition parties. Within the opposition movement, particularly the NPU and the Labor Party, there are various tendencies which cannot be spoken of in the same terms, since within these parties a sweeping polarization, which has recently tried to take on even broader dimensions, is taking place among the ranks of the cadres. We imagine, and expect, that this polarization will occur even faster among some of the more dubious forces, which will back down under the pressure of the given facts of the situation. Therefore, within these parties themselves there are tendencies and currents, some of which are reformist and accordist and others of which are mass revolutionary, and which are all now in a state of flux. We believe that the final victory will be to the revolutionary trend, particularly because it has always kept pace with the existing mass movement, and also because this revolutionary trend within those parties has always coexisted with the course of events in the mass movement, thus leading to the development of new cadres within the mass movement who we hope will join ranks with the more experienced leaders. This is the year of life--it is a historical imperative that the new cadres pursue their true course and that these opposition forces escape from their present dilemma.

The Masses' Fruitful Coming-of-Age

[Question] One aspect of the crisis in the Egyptian opposition came to light recently in the propositions of "mass dryness" and "building up the national economy with foreign aid," although the course of events proved the exact opposite. What is your reply to those propositions, which are an attempt to cover up and smooth over the crisis?

[Answer] We feel that the opposition forces' crisis is essentially a leadership crisis, not a crisis of "mass dryness."

Serious incidents might occur sometimes without arousing any mass reaction, but should we hold the masses accountable? or the forces which are presumably the masses' leaders?

The fact is that the present situation in Egypt holds ample evidence of a fruitful mass coming-of-age and an anger towards the regime, which became obvious after the bombing of the PLO base in Tunisia, the hijacking of the Egyptian plane, Israel's act of piracy against the Libyan plane, and the murder of Sulayman Khatir. Scientifically and logically, it must be said that no mass movement can be expected to carry on firmly and steadily without leaders. It is a known fact that any mass movement experiences waves of expansion and contraction. The primary role of the leaders is to give continuity to a spontaneous movement, and to elevate it from a spontaneous movement to an organized, purposeful political movement.

It might be said, and we believe it might be partly true, that "mass awareness" comes before "leaders' awareness." This might seem odd, but it is a fact if we put it in its proper context. The masses have gained, and there

has become lodged in their consciousness, specific concepts and convictions which constitute an advanced form of awareness, an awareness acquired from the facts of life, their class situation, and their sufferings.

As for the leaders, if we look at the problem purely in the sense of awareness, i.e. the comprehension of purely political concepts and the ability to analyze and debate, then some might feel that this is a true awareness. However, it does not express mass interests, nor is it in the interest of the emerging exploited struggling mass forces.

In this case, therefore, mass awareness might achieve partial, temporary gains, but will never achieve radical, strategic goals. Herein lies the role of leadership as we understand it: leadership should clearly express mass interests and programs, should be capable of winning mass approval, and should be prepared to change strategic awareness. Those who call for utilizing foreign aid to build up the nation's economy are suffering from a delusion. The economy can be properly built up only by providing national financing, reclaiming and planting millions of feddans, and providing jobs for new workers; this can be done only by establishing an independent national authority.

Objective and Subjective Factors

[Question] Can the rejectionist, spontaneous Egyptian mass movement develop its struggling constituents and put the opposition leaders in a position where they will be able to make qualitative changes?

[Answer] There are objective and subjective factors. There are many objective factors, such as international monopolies and their utilization and monopolization of technological progress, as well as their skill at developing such techniques, especially with our petroleum--that resource which has come to be a curse on us, but which could have been such a blessing. Furthermore, the middle class has grown and has become a "safety valve" for the classes, since radical accordist tendencies are prevalent among this class. These objective factors cannot be denied.

The deciding factor is the subjective one--the ability to grasp the new situation, to develop concepts, programs and work methods to correspond with these developments, and to come up with practical, revolutionary solutions which will meet with the masses' approval. This will be the deciding factor in mobilizing the masses and guiding their activity in such a way as to ensure that national and social missions will be achieved, by establishing a national class authority opposed to the existing authority and the class alliance which holds its reins.

We feel that most of the present leaders are still buzzing around outdated concepts and solutions which were fixed and circumscribed after the Second World War and which never transcended those bounds. At the head of the list of these solutions so useless in our present situation comes reliance on the local bourgeoisie and their "delegation" to carry out the task of national transformation. Historically, these classes have basically been failures from the standpoint of their ability to lead the national democratic mission.

An effective mass movement exists which possesses all the requirements for the struggle, in the sense of being ready to sacrifice and to pay the price of the struggle. The proof lies in recent events in Egypt, such as the central security forces' "uprising," during which hundreds of victims fell. Even so, the mass movement was not stopped; it might be halted for a while, but it will break out even stronger than before, as anticipated by all the Egyptian national opposition forces. This is the basic standard for the masses' readiness to act and to sacrifice.

The missing subjective factor is beginning to crystallize now, in an embryonic yet rapidly-growing form. The convergence of these two factors will result in a truly revolutionary, mature state which will guarantee revolutionary change.

The Growth of Popular Emnity Towards America and Israel

[Question] Even though the Camp David agreements have been blockaded on the Arab level, what is the domestic feeling--rejection or acceptance?

[Answer] In Egypt nowadays, emnity towards the United States and Israel is growing, and resentment towards the Camp David agreements is increasing far and wide. Rejection of all forms of subservience, and of the Mubarak regime's persistence in its subservience and openness policies, is truly growing among the masses. This does not mean that the Egyptian masses are facing up to this regime and its policies which, in our opinion, indicate the crisis which exists within the Egyptian regime. Rather, the slogans of the popular demonstrations seen in Egypt are directed against the United States and Israel, and against the subservience of the Egyptian regime. These slogans are chanted by the angry Egyptian masses demanding the downfall of Camp David as a program and a charter and the end of subservience to America. This anger and rejection stems from the rapidly-growing mass movement, and will not stop with angry, rejectionist popular demonstrations. There is a new manifestation of popular rejection--the initiation of hostile operations against the American-Israeli presence in Egypt. There are many examples of this steadily-growing phenomenon, the most recent being the shooting at the industrial exhibit and at American ships hassping through the Suez Canal. There is no doubt that these hostile acts are a new factor, even though they are not wide-spread. They constitute a qualitative shift which truly voices the general mass frame of mind and expresses the desired solution--that Egypt be fully sovereign and that the strugglers be entitled to a peaceful life.

Utter Confusion

[Question] What does your Communist Party think about the opposition's proposals about work methods, alliance forces, and party programs?

[Answer] We have disagreed with some Egyptian political forces over "methods" and "alliance forces." With respect to methods, we reject the technique of holding high-level meetings between the authorities and some political opposition forces, and demand that they be held on the mass level. A simple example of this would be the formation of national democratic committees

at places of work and residence. These committees would not necessarily have to adopt standardized work methods; they could draw up their demands according to the circumstances under which they live, and could then gradually develop common causes--the right to strike and the abolition of the Camp David agreements--by working among their constituents.

There is a great deal of commotion over identifying who should be part of the alliance forces. There might not be any dispute over identifying which social forces are qualified to join this alliance of workers, peasants and so forth, but there is a certain disregard for these forces which has attracted the attention of existing political parties. It is only natural that the invitation to the alliance be limited to the Labor, NPU, Nasserite and Communist Parties, but what has happened is that the invitation is now being extended to all Egyptian parties and forces indiscriminately. There is utter confusion, with revolutionary forces being mixed up with counter-revolutionary forces, and arbitrary lines of separation being drawn between them.

With regard to the opposition front's program, we have suggested the formulation of a national program which could achieve the goals of social change. The other forces have now begun offering one of two different concepts; oddly enough, they combine the two into one idea. On the one hand, they call for setting up an intermediate phase within the existing regime, and for eliminating parasitism instead of the regime, so as to guide it and improve its economic performance. On the other hand, they propose a general national program for all forces without exception, including those who support subservience and imperialist brokerage and those who have a direct interest in continuing this subservience. This is our stand, which shows clearly just how much we differ. You can judge for yourself.

The Hysterical Attack On Syria

[Question] What do you think of Syria's stand on American-Zionist threats and its other fundamental, firm, nationalist stands?

[Answer] First of all, in order to evaluate Syria's honorable, resolute role, you need only follow the American administration's strange, hysterical attack, which is basically directed at Syria itself, even though it began with attacks on Granada, Libya, and other places.

The hysterical American-Zionist series of attacks is aimed at two spots which represent the principal bases of defiance against imperialism and its plots for hegemony--Syria in the Arab world, and Nicaragua in Latin America. This is not to dismiss imperialist plans to strike at all bases of perseverance and challenge to American hegemony, but right now the imperialists are obviously concentrating on trying to get rid of the thorn of "resolute Syria," which disturbs the sleep of all the colonialists.

Strategic Parity

[Question] In spite of all the threats against Syria, which is determined to achieve strategic parity with the Zionist enemy, what should the Arab national liberation forces do, in the face of foreign threats against Syria, to realize their own potentials?

[Answer] First of all, Syria is capable of offering up the greatest sacrifices in order to protect this main fortress of perseverance. Naturally, strategic parity with the Zionist enemy, as proposed by Syria, is the main thing upsetting imperialist and Zionist circles.

At present, the main trend in American-Zionist aggression is to try to upset the parity which Syria is striving for.

Syrian perseverance is a major factor in broader Arab perseverance, and guarantees the return of some type and degree of Arab solidarity. This perseverance is sure to thwart imperialist-Zionist regional plotting.

All indications point to the danger of an Israeli-American attack against Syria, a danger which is virtually certain, because all available facts confirm it. On the one hand, there is the international milieu, in which imperialist forces have to a certain extent succeeded in mobilizing European public opinion along racist, anti-Arab lines. However, we believe that this success is only temporary.

In addition, there is the "Israeli factor," which wants to assert itself as a strike force in the region, now that the direct American military intervention in Libya has shaken things up. Israel relies on this theory, by means of which it has been able to attract huge financial contributions from Europe and the United States in order to serve its expansionist goals.

Furthermore, there is Arab fragmentation, which imperialism is trying to exploit before the Arabs return to their natural state of cohesiveness and nationalist sentiments are rekindled.

Therefore, we call on all Arab nationalist forces to stand firm with Syria in every way, not just through political support but by giving the Syrian people and regime all kinds of political, material and moral support, particularly since Syria's future will be important in determining the future of the Arab national liberation movement as a whole.

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CSO: 4504/361

FOREIGN MINISTER SUMS UP POLICIES, REVIEWS VISIT TO FRANCE

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 16 Jun 86 pp 14, 15

[Article: "We Have a Single Condition for Normalizing Relations with Damascus"]

[Text] Mr Tariq 'Aziz, Iraqi deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, held a press conference at the conclusion of his official visit to Paris which he began by stating, "I would like to say that I am very satisfied with this visit of mine to Paris. I was not anxious or dissatisfied before I came, but nonetheless I stress my satisfaction with my visit to Paris. The talks I held with the president, the prime minister, my colleague the minister of foreign affairs and the ministers of finance and defense have been successful. In the course of them, I asserted Iraq's concern for relations of friendship and cooperation with France and its desire to continue these relations not just in the current circumstances but also forever to all the French officials. I heard clear, strong assertions from all the French officials that their view of friendship is harmonious and in agreement with ours. Perhaps this visit of mine has been an occasion for us to declare jointly, we and the French party, that there are no clouds in Iraqi-French relations, and they are unsullied and bright."

[Question] Have French-Iraqi relations been affected by the process of normalization now going on between France and Iran? Did you come to Paris to get special assistance in the financial and armament areas and to obtain helicopters and mortars?

Tariq 'Aziz: As far as relations between France and Iran go, I stated our position in a manner which does not permit ambiguity. We respect our friends and respect their political options. If they want to establish normal relations with Iran, that is their business, and we do not consider that a hostile position or one contrary to Iraq. I am totally confident that no formula the French party arrives at for relations with Iran will affect our good relations with France. As far as the second part of the question goes, I would like to inform you that the financial dossiers common to Iraq and France were settled before my visit to Paris and were settled at the level of experts. This means that there are ongoing, automatic relations which progress in a regular manner, and the same is the situation with respect to

requests for military equipment. These treaties between Iraq and France progress in a normal, natural way. I as a representative of the Iraqi government did not come to present requests so much as to state a position and take the opportunity for an exchange of views with the French government on bilateral issues and conditions in the region. An accurate description of my visit is that it is a political one.

[Question] Did you inform French officials about the efforts underway to narrow the differences in views between Iraq and Syria? Is there a specific date for the meeting between you and the Syrian minister of foreign affairs?

Tariq 'Aziz: There are efforts to improve relations between Iraq and Syria which His Majesty King Husayn is carrying out. Before that, His Highness Prince 'Abdallah Ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz and his excellency the Tunisian prime minister carried out similar attempts. However, they still are attempts. I cannot talk about tangible things here. I informed our French friends about the information we have. Arrangements are being made to arrange a meeting between Iraqi and Syrian officials and I cannot say more than that.

[Question] What are the Iraqi conditions for the normalization of Syrian-Iraqi relations?

Tariq 'Aziz: We have only one condition, which is that Syria act as an Arab country committed to the documents it signed with us and the other Arab countries.

[Question] Is it true that there is an intention to reopen the line to pump Iraqi oil across Syrian territory? Will you double the quantities of oil to France as of next month?

Tariq 'Aziz: As far as the first part of the question goes, we have not yet started with the first step. The first meeting between officials in the two countries has not yet taken place. Therefore, it is premature to talk about subsequent steps. As to the second part, we have talked in general about Iraqi oil supplies to France, but we have not discussed figures and it is expected that a specialized Iraqi delegation will arrive to open the oil dossier.

[Question] What is the effect of Mas'ud Rajavi's presence in Iraq on relations between Iran and Iraq?

Tariq 'Aziz: I believe that Mr Mas'ud Rajavi is now prospering in Iraq; when he arrived I myself was not there, but I expect that he is satisfied. As far as his presence there and the effect of that on Iraqi-Iranian relations go, the Iranians have a government formed that is to be installed in Iraq when they take Iraq over; Iraq's invitation to the leaders of the Iranian opposition is reciprocal treatment. When Iran acts against us, we act against it. When it interferes in our affairs, we interfere in its. The mullahs must understand that they are not free in actions, and others can act also. We were patient for a long time, and we believe that the time has come for us not to be patient with them, not just in this area but in the military field as well.

[Question] Will the normalization of French-Iranian relations lead in the medium term to the termination of the Iraqi-Iranian conflict?

Tariq 'Aziz: We do not tie the former to the latter.

[Question] Will you offer the Iranian opposition leaders the same facilities they enjoyed here in France?

Tariq 'Aziz: The Iranian opposition leaders came purely of their own choice; we welcomed their arrival and are offering them all the aid we can so that they will be successful in their mission.

[Question] Is Iraq satisfied with its relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries? Does it support the holding of an urgent Arab summit?

Tariq 'Aziz: We are satisfied with our relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and all Arab countries except for those which support Iran in the war against Iraq. Iraq supports the holding of the Arab summit and does not set out conditions for Arab meetings. We believe in the continuity and regularity of Arab meetings.

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CSO: 4404/364

AGRICULTURE BENEFITS FROM MOSCOW CONNECTION

London MEED in English 21 Jun 86 pp 18-19

Article by Jonathan Crusoe]

[Text]

THE Soviet Union has played a large part, both technically and financially, in developing Iraqi industry and agriculture over the past 25 years. The economic relationship looks set to continue: long-term trade and economic protocols were signed recently. In addition, Soviet companies were awarded two key contracts in May, during the 16th session of the joint economic commission.

One of the contracts is for a section of the second phase of the main outfall drain (MOD) scheme, designed to collect highly saline irrigation water from 1.5 million hectares and drain it into the Gulf. The order went to Selkhozpromexport, which has worked on the scheme already: it was responsible for the $64 million first phase, and drew up outline designs for the second phase's southern section.

The latest contract calls for Selkhozpromexport — a specialist in agriculture and irrigation work — to provide technical assistance in building the MOD's central section. This covers about 200 kilometres between Khor al-Dalmaj and the Shatra West drain, near Nasiriya, collecting water

Over the past 25 years, Soviet contractors have played a key role in developing Iraqi industry and agriculture

from both the East and West Gharaff drains. Work will start at the end of 1986, and will take three-four years, the Novosti Press Agency (APN) reports.

The second phase, planned by the Irrigation Ministry to increase the MOD's discharge capacity, is being built in three sections. The southern section — from Nasiriya to the Shatt al-Basra canal — is being built by a West German joint venture of Philipp Holzmann and Polensky & Zoellner; it is for completion later this year (MEED 17:8:84, page 10). The northern part will drain areas north of Khor al-Dalmaj.

Controlling flooding

Selkhozpromexport is also involved in a scheme to improve flood control and irrigation in the area north of Baghdad. It is working on a 65-kilometre canal linking Lake Tharthar with the river Tigris, after building a 37-kilometre canal between Tharthar and the Euphrates.

It has previously worked on the head section of the 37-kilometre main canal in the Saddam (formerly Kirkuk) irrigation project and the $225.8 million Fallouja dam.

The dam, completed in 1985, was built on the Euphrates, south of Fallouja. It includes a navigation lock and a canal head regulator for the main Abu Ghraib canal, which will irrigate the Yusifiya, Latifiya and Iskanderiya agricultural projects.

A second Soviet contractor, Technopromexport, is involved in another large scheme on the Euphrates: construction of the $1,129 million Qadisiya (formerly Haditha) dam (MEED 8:2:85, page 13).

Soviet help for oil schemes

The hydrocarbons sector is another area in which Soviet contractors are heavily involved. The second of the two contracts

awarded at the May commission meeting was for a gas pipeline between Nasiriya and Baghdad. Contractor for the estimated $60 million scheme is Tsvetmetpromexport; construction will start by October and is expected to take 18 months, APN says. Western companies have bid for associated subcontracts (MEED 14:6:86; 31:5:86).

Moscow-based Technoexport is drilling injection and operating holes in the West Qurna oil field — western companies have bid to set up production installations — and is continuing to build an injection system in the North Rumaila oil field (MEED 1:2:86; 26:10:85).

The Soviet Union has been helping to develop North Rumaila for the past 18 years. In 1969, it made a $70 million loan — repayable in oil — which proved important both economically and politically three years later in helping Baghdad to withstand pressure from western oil companies protesting about Iraq Petroleum Company's (IPC) nationalisation.

The field came on stream the same year; all prospecting, survey and development work was carried out by Soviet firms.

Co-operation between the two countries officially began in March 1959, when the first economic and technical agreement was signed. Projects covered included the Iskanderiya agricultural equipment factory — built by Prommashexport — the Ramadi glass works and the Samarra antibiotics factory, as well as the establishment of vocational and technical schools.

Iraq: trade with the Soviet Union, 1982-85
($ million)

	1985	1984	1983	1982
Exports	662.7	825.7	490.0	23.2
Imports	318.4	336.9	475.8	1,250.0

Source: Moscow Narodny Bank, London

In the 1970s, work began on a series of irrigation and agricultural schemes, as well as on electricity projects. These included power stations at Nasiriya, Najibiya, Dokan and Derbendikhan, all of which were built by Technopromexport. Technoexport was commissioned to build the 500,000-tonne-a-year Samawa cement works; Tsvetmetpromexport built a 540-kilometre oil products pipeline between Basra and Baghdad.

Co-operation guidelines

Since 1984, guidelines for co-operation have been set out in a series of government-to-government agreements. These culminated at the May joint commission meetings in the signing of a five-year protocol that includes four separate accords, for industry, oil, agriculture, irrigation and dam construction, and scientific research.

The schemes covered in these agreements are likely to be financed by a $2,000 million long-term Soviet credit made available — at minimal interest rates — in 1984 (MEED 20:7:84; 4:5:84).

The two sides also aim to expand trade, as part of a five-year agreement signed in June. The trade agreement, to run from 1986-90, replaces one signed in 1981. In 1985, the value of exports to the Soviet Union — mainly oil, dates, and skins and hides — was more than double the value of imports, which consisted mostly of machinery and equipment.

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GENERAL AGRICULTURAL BOARD'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN MAYSAN NOTED

Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 16 Jun 86 p 7

[Article by Ghazi Kaytan: "Broad Efforts and Services for Carrying out the Agricultural Plan"]

[Text] The General Agriculture and Agrarian Reform Authority in the Governorate of Maysan is performing great tasks, at the forefront of which lies the execution of the agricultural plan in the governorate for the current winter and coming summer and winter seasons.

In order to learn about the details of this plan and the authority's commitments in various agricultural areas, we met with Mr Falhi Husayn 'Ali, the authority's director general, who told us through accurate statistics and figures the most prominent features of the agricultural plan in the governorate for these seasons.

The director general of the authority said:

"This plan which the agricultural council in the governorate has approved and the annual agricultural conference held at the end of last year agreed to takes stock of all emergency circumstances in the future and also the exceptional circumstances the governorate is going through in its capacity as one of the governorates confronting the racist Iranian enemy. We have devoted our attention to all the facilities for the optimum execution of the plan, and for some time have been saving the technical resources necessary for that in order to make it a success, in service to our domestic economy and in translation of the slogan on whose behalf the conference was held: 'No good befalls a nation which eats more than it produces and reaps less than it sows.'"

The director general of the authority went on to say:

"Up to the end of 1985, the area of land prepared for execution of the plan came to 513,000 donums. The area reclaimed in the Nahr Sa'd and Abu Bashut projects was 53,254 donums, while the area of land the authority leased out, to 152 tenants, in accordance with Law 25 for 1983, came to 69,036 donums.

"As to the areas proposed to be farmed and its expected crop production for this year's summer season, we have prepared the necessary measures for farming an area of 29,875 donums with a capacity of 14,937 tons in the case of (shalab) of both the al-'Anbar and al-Gharibah strains, 5,911 donums in the case of yellow corn, 12,022 for white corn, 3,247 donums for sesame, 4,495 donums for (mash), 2,712 for tobacco, 54 donums for tomatoes, 14,250 donums for fine grain, 13,281 donums for cucumbers of both types, 1,491 donums for beans, 2,202 for watermelon, 2,358 for okra, 172 donums for peppers, 662 for eggplant and 100 donums for other crops. Thus, the total land allocated for this season comes to 92,842 donums, distributed among the cooperative societies, the private sector, the tenants and full time farmers.

"As to the 1986-87 winter season, the details of the plan for that have been apportioned over an area of 235,553 donums, as follows: 55,424 donums for wheat, 143,319 donums for barley, 25,903 donums for lima beans, 827 donums for dry onions, 86 donums for covered tomatoes, 1,698 for the jute crop, 2,619 for berseem, 1,051 for green onions, 1,169 for (shalgham), 65 donums for sugar beets, 983 donums for radishes, 529 for chard, 1,460 for lettuce, 105 for carrots and 315 donums for other crops."

Concerning the plan for establishing fruit orchards, groves and pastures for this year, the director general pointed out that the plan would add 169 donums of date trees to what currently exists, which is 15,214 donums. In the area of the plan to produce and prepare date palms, that, according to the plan, would come to 250,900 fruit trees with a capacity of more than 5,000 tons.

The plan for groves for this year constitutes the improvement and maintenance of 470 donums of currently existing groves and the planting of trees on 100 donums, with an additional 50 donums of trees for external roads, the maintenance of 310 donums on these roads and the production of 250,000 forest seedlings.

Concerning agricultural services and requirements, Mr Falhi Husayn 'Ali, the director general of the General Agriculture and Agrarian Reform Authority in Maysan, said that the authority had recommended the provision of 1,169 tons of urea fertilizer, 1,120 of NP fertilizer, 2,000 bags of potassium fertilizer and 2,000 cases of GV 9 fertilizer for the coming winter and summer seasons.

Alongside seeds, the agricultural plan includes the provision of 71 tons of seeds for the (shalab) crop, 48 tons of yellow corn, 191 tons of wheat, 149 tons of barley, 149 tons of lima beans, 20 tons of dry onions, 2 tons of berseem seeds and 155 tons of different kinds of seeds for other summer and winter crops and vegetables.

The authority has also approved the provision of 242 tractors, 76 reapers, 29 shovels and 14 other items of heavy equipment, while the number of pumps of various horsepowers required for the year 1986 came to 2,336. There is an additional large number of various items of agricultural equipment and requirements to serve the work and facilitate the execution of the plan, with the provision of 320 sprinklers of various capacities.

In another feature of this plan, we see that there are very large numbers of insecticides which the authority has committed itself to providing, and it has decided to combat a number of insects and pests on 114,000 donums with insecticides totalling 2,000 tons in amount.

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POLES DEEMED ACCEPTABLE IN UNIFIL

London FOREIGN REPORT in English 12 Jun 86 p 3

[Text] The Soviet Union has decided to play a much more active role in Lebanon. This could include the introduction of Polish troops into UNIFIL, the UN force in southern Lebanon.

After talks between the new Soviet ambassador to Lebanon, **Vassily Kolotoucha**, and **President Amin Gemayel**, the Soviet Union agreed to pay $8m for the upkeep of UNIFIL. As a quid pro quo for the $8m, Gemayel agreed that Lebanon would state, at the next debate on the issue in the UN Security Council, that Polish troops were acceptable as part of UNIFIL.

UNIFIL is going through a crisis of confidence. Its role has always been ambiguous in the tangled world of southern Lebanon. Since it was set up in 1978, over 40 members of the force have been killed. France and Ireland, two big contributors of troops, have been reconsidering their commitments. The Dutch have already pulled out. The United States' last contribution, of $9m, was for the period between October 1984 and April 1985.

The question will come up at the Security Council again in July because the French, in the last debate in April, would commit their troops only for another three months. Faced with the possible arrival of Polish troops, however, the western governments may decide not to pull out.

Israel would also be unhappy about the arrival of a Polish contingent. In the Israeli view, Polish intelligence officers would be given an opportunity to probe Israeli security arrangements in the border area and pass them to the Russians, who in turn might pass them to Syria.

A side-effect of the Soviet move has been to strengther. the position of Gemayel, who is Lebanon's head of state in name only. The Soviet ambassador, an expert Arabist, has also been trying to heal the breach between Gemayel and Syria's **President Hafez Assad**.

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LEBANON

FADLALLAH CONCERNED OVER SYRIAN CONTAINMENT POLICY

Beirut CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY in English 23 Jun 86 pp 13-14

[Text]

CNA.- El-Cid is the nick-name of sheikh Mohamed Hussein Fadlallah, the spiritual leader of "Hizballah", Lebanon's 'Party of God', whose close ties with Iran are no secret. His recent rise on the local scene, and most particularly within the Shiite community - the largest Moslem community in this country, has turned him into a potential enemy of Syria because, for one thing, the Amal Movement led by Nabih Berri is the right name for the Shiites Syrians are allied to in Lebanon and, for another, because as a rule, Syria wants no "strongmen" in Lebanon, and with time on the side of the Shiites, a man of El-Cid's stature may well become, one day, as tall as the legendary character of Corneille's tragedy and perhaps too great a man for Syria to control.

Syria had "tolerated" the 'Party of God' in Lebanon just to please Iran and because its presence on the Lebanese scene was in line with Syria's tactics of handling factions in this country on the basis of a "the more the merrier" as long as Damascus pulled the strings. The real strings, that is. For example, there have been Lebanese pro-Palestinian groups and Lebanese pro-Libyan groups, but Syria's close ties with the PLO (at the time) and Libyan leaders was Syria's insurance policy against the danger of any of those groups crossing any of Syria's red lines or growing too big to be tolerated.

With Hizballah, however, things went differently. The new party was not only growing bigger and getting better organized and more powerful militarily, but started to attract defectors from Amal and to coordinate action with pro-Arafat Palestinians. The Syrians started to be alarmed and, at one time, towards the end of the summer of 1985, they even seriously considered dealing the Party a severe if not deadly blow. But then, the Damascus I agreement ending the first camps war was reached, the pro-Arafat Palestinians were put under control and the Syrians started working hard to get the Tripartite Accord through, hoping that by so doing they would be in control of the situation and that Hizballah would be disarmed alongside all other factions and just die down.

Hizballah was a strong opponent of the Tripartite Accord because it probably knew that it meant an "end game" as far as it was concerned. And since January 15, the day Syria's accord sank, Hizballah has been causing a lot of trouble to Syria, if only because of its becoming the main reason for strained relations between Damascus and Teheran.

Any Iran watcher with a minimum amount of common sense will guess that Lebanon, with its Shiite population growing at a very high rate, is bound to become a predominantly Shiite Moslem country by the year 2000 - that's only 13 years from now - and that it should, accordingly, be the most "qualified" of all Arab countries to become an Islamic Republic Iranian style, and that Iran's interest in Lebanon is, therefore, not some kind of a passing parade but part of the Khomeynist long-term strategy of building the Islamic Empire anew.

The Syrians certainly know all about Iran's ambitions, but instead of sharing other Arab countries' fears of the 'Iranian syndrome' they found it more profitable for them to make a "strategic alliance" with Iran and go on marketing their special ties with their ally in Arab countries of the Gulf, thus profiting from both sides, as a "strategic ally" and as the reliable Arab country "that will serve as a safety valve" in the face of the Khomeynist peril.

Many observers believe that, deep inside, President Assad knows that the Islamic Republic in Iran is unlikely to survive its founder and that its fall is only a matter of time and that he might as well make the most of its present rise.

Mashghara

But since theyday the Tripartite Accord collapsed and Syria started to lose its grip on Lebanon, Syria and Iran are on a collision course with the Iranians speeding up their proliferating operation in Lebanon and the Syrians trying to regain control of lost ground.

There have already been two Syrian-Iranian "confrontations" in Lebanon. One was in the township of Mashghara, in the western Bekaa, and the other was in connection with the release of the hostages.

In Mashghara, it was Hizballah who started the confrontation by actually invading the township and dislodging the pro-Syrian militia of the Syrian National-Social Party from what was considered as one of their main strongholds in the area. The Syrians first tried to get Hizballah out by turning to Teheran but then were forced to intervene militarily and at this stage, Iran "warned" the Syrians not to enter the township with tanks and not to use force. Whether they used force or not is not quite clear. What is, however, is that the Syrians won, and this was viewed in Teheran as a warning that Syrian red lines must not be violated.

In an interview with the magazine AL-ANBAA, the mouthpiece of Walid Jumblatt's Progressive Socialist Party, Fadlallah expressed concerned over what happened in Mashghara and suggested that "the events" that took place there "may be the prelude of a containment policy aimed at blockading the state of holy war (Jihad) one way or another", which means that he suspects the Syrians of preparing to turn the witch-hunt they have so far been conducting against Hizballah into an all-out war.

As for the hostages, all of which are believed to be held by Hizballah which is using different names for phoney groups, Syria believes the time is now ripe for them to be released while Iran doesn't think so. All hostages are in Lebanon and this makes the Syrians almost sure that whatever deal Iran may have in mind in return for the hostages, their release will forcibly have to be at least a "joint venture".

Syrian sources in West Beirut said if it were not for Syria's concern for the lives of the hostages, it would have already used force to release them.

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LEBANON

'RADICAL' CHANGES INTRODUCED IN PHALANGE

Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English 23-29 Jun 86 pp 16-17

[Article by Nadim Abou-Ghannam]

[Text]

It is said the Lebanese Forces benefitted most from the recent Phalangist Party elections, since they obtained a number of posts in the party's political bureau. Will this affect the party's future policy, and how ?

The elections were a victory for the Phalangists alone, since all the successful candidates are known for their loyalty to the party. Even if some of these also have military (Lebanese Forces) posts, it does not mean that a specific trend now controls the political bureau. These people have given a lot for the party, and the Phalangists do not believe in keeping responsibilities away from the qualified members, whether they have proved their competence in the military or the political field.

The work of the political bureau will not be affected by the results of the elections, especially as those members who occupied military posts were also attending the meetings of the political bureau and discussing political issues, for political and military issues are closely interwined.

Will the Phalangist Party persevere in the policy that prevailed under incumbent President Elie Karame, or will it be introducing changes in its system or constitution for example ?

The political system has been partly amended under the current ((Karame) leadership, and a committee has already been formed to suggest any needed amendments. The outgoing political bureau has either adopted these changes, or recommended their adoption, since it could not really, knowing the elections and a possible change were close, introduce numerous changes to which the new political bureau would be committed.

I think the new political party will devote itself to studying the suggested changes, especially as the «modernization» of the party has always been a Phalangist concern. Contrary to general belief, the party is not «fossilized». It has already amended its system a number of times, and introduced new priorities whenever the need arose, such as in the case of the displaced people or high cost of living, which we have remedied to by establishing popular cooperatives. We will continue doing so whenever the need arises, and we will prove, by introducing radical amendments — if the political bureau agrees — that the Phalangist Party is not fossilized.

Can you name some of these radical changes ?

Strengthening the political bureau, since I am the president of a party whose decision-making body is the political bureau. We are considering the activation of the political bureau, the central council, the

secretariat-general. along with other suggested issues which will certainly be amended if the political bureau finds necessary.

Once you assume your new post, will you consider making contact or sending envoys to Damascus ?

We have no prejudice against anyone. We have our political principles according to which we open up to everyone. The Phalangist relationship with Syria is an old one. and we are not the ones who broke it. but whatever happened was a result of the change in Syrian attitude.

Will you consider calling for a general conference grouping all the Lebanese parties as an initiative on your part to try and put an end to the national crisis ?

The Phalangist Party is known to favor dialogue. especially at times of crisis. The best illustration is our initiative in 1943. which led to the Lebanese independence. and various other contacts done by the party with all Lebanese leaders and parties. and all in Lebanon's interest. In 1958. the Phalangist Party contacted everyone. and the result was that life returned to normal and remained so until 1969. This shows that the Phalangists never stopped their quest for dialogue. but that events prevented them from achieving it. The Phalangist belief in dialogue has not changed however. and we still stretch out our hands to whoever is willing to enter dialogue.

Can we understand that you are considering calling for a dialogue session?

It depends on the circumstances. and whether the rest of the Lebanese parties agree with us on the need to get out of this crisis. for we are convinced that no one has benefitted from the Lebanese events. We will be up to the responsibility. and we call on the others to rise to the level of national responsibility too.

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We are ready for any dialogue that can serve lebanon's interest.

Now that the «Christian project» has failed to see the light, will you try to formulate a new one ?

The Lebanese project was not the work of the Phalangist Party alone. but of the parties and leaderships in this (Christian) region. and it was been presented to the leaders who did not participate in its formulation. Since some of these leaders had agreed on it. the project has not failed and is still considered a working agenda open to discussion. When it was formulated. it was intended to be presented to all the Lebanese. and if there truly is an intention to solve the Lebanese crisis. they must all study this project. suggest amendments if they feel it is necessary. and if we agree to these amendments. we will produce a joint Lebanese project that could lead us out of our national crisis.

How would you comment on Premier Rashid Karami's call for the simultaneous resignation of the president and government, or the reduction of the presidential term to four years ?

I am sorry to see that a prime minister can make such a suggestion. A prime minister is required to assume his responsibilities as such, rather than call for the resignation of the president.

Karami is very pessimistic, whereas the statements of President Amin Gemayel during his tour of Arab countries express strong optimism. How can we reconcile between the two, and who would you side with ?

We should be realistic. neither pessimistic nor optimistic.

Do you think the recent Damascus agreement concerning security in West Beirut and the camps will be implemented ?

I hope so.

JOURNALIST VISITS BATTLE FRONT NEAR SIDON

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic 31 May-6 Jun 84 pp 28, 29

[Article: "And During the Day the Combatants Relax!"]

[Text] All Lebanese and Syrian attention shifted toward the Kafr Falus front when the Israeli commanders escalated the tone of their threats against Damascus and this front turned into a military beehive in positions facing the Sidon area, where the armed men of the progressive parties and Islamic groups are present, and the area of Jazzin, where the armed men of the "Army of Southern Lebanon" directly supported by Israel are.

Getting to the front is not easy. As well as being unsafe, there are many difficulties in the way of doing so on the part of the armed persons themselves, who, as one of them says, no longer have faith in the evil of the journalists. The reason, in their view, is that journalists, who carry out investigations or reporting on the front, might, if only by an intention which is not ill, reveal military positions from which people's attention is supposed to stay as far removed as possible. Then there is another reason, as one of them also says, which is that some armed people whom the journalists interview are not good at political expression, which might prompt them to make statements and take positions which are in contradiction with the body they belong to.

However, within the front, in the ranks of the combatants, the picture is different. Conversation with combatants is not tied to any rules, usage or traditions. Sometimes you present a combatant a question which does not need a simple, short answer, and he answers you in a manner which goes on for a number of hours, if your nerves can stand the waiting and listening. At other times, the opposite occurs, when a combatant will answer you himself with curt phrases for a question which requires a detailed, lengthy answer. However, on other occasions, the major disaster occurs; that takes place when you pose your question to a combatant without your knowing or being able to read his inner turmoil and psychological disarray. What happens in this case?

We did not learn the answer, but indeed faced it as a sudden fait accompli on the advanced lines of combat in the Kafr Falus front. When we got there,

it was nearly 1000 hours in the morning. We did not know what had happened before that; all we knew was what our companion, who had belonged to a progressive organization since the start of the Lebanese war in 1975, was anxious to tell us all along the road connecting Sidon to the front, which lies to the east of Sidon. He tirelessly kept saying that the military situation on the front had been very disturbed the night before and that we had to take every necessary precaution lest we suddenly move on to the next world.

From a distance, the front does not seem like a front. Had our companion not gestured with his hand, stating that the Kafr Falus front extended from one given point to another, we would not have realized that it was then very close to us. What inspired this ignorance concerning the lack of knowledge of the location of the front was not just the failure to hear any gunshots or the detonation of any artillery or missile projectiles; in addition, which is more important, we did not come upon any combatant on the rough road we were tracking and everything indicated an absence of life, an absence of any living being, and everyone who was able to move lay before us at that moment.

Our companion perceived our bewilderment and, combining laughter and ridicule, said, "After a little you will see something to gladden your mind" (he meant the sounds of bullets, artillery and rockets). It was the general custom for this front to be quiet before noon, because the young people passed the night and the hours of dawn, up to the morning, in battles and observing the enemy's movements, and rested before noon. This applied to positions in the opposite front as well.

The period before noon is the best time to go about the front "freely," and this is what actually happened when our companion reached the front lines, where hundreds of combatants and lines of heavy weapons were located.

He told us, "Feel free to engage in your business now." There, at one of the forward positions in the front, we met Abu Siraj, the military person in charge of one of the main points there. He described the nature of the military conditions present in the area, stating, "Everything in this area is to be considered heated, in terms of combat or in terms of the current complex political circumstances. We reached this position after we managed to deliver a military blow at Lahad's group a short period after the Israeli withdrawal from the region. What happened then is very important. Although many people were not attentive to its importance and seriousness, nonetheless the things it brought to the fore have still been exerting pressure up to now, since, after the Israeli enemy was compelled to withdraw from the city of Sidon and its surroundings under the pressure of the blows we landed on it in the context of the 'Lebanese national resistance,' it tried to implant its agents in some villages north of Sidon, considering that it would be able to kill two birds with one stone by this procedure, first, maintaining an indirect military presence (through its agents) in the areas from which it withdrew, and, second, seeking to create factional strife in the area between Moslems and Christians analogous to what happened in the mountain area between the Christians and Druzes, in the wake of the withdrawal of the Israeli occupation from it."

Abu Siraj continued his statement by stating, "However, we thwarted the occupation force and its agents. On the one hand, we carried out a sudden

military operation at that time in which we compelled the forces of the 'Army of Southern Lebanon' to withdraw from the positions the Israeli occupation wanted it to hold. It is true that thousands of Christians and Moslems were compelled to migrate from their villages, but we were forced into this. The situation remains the lesser of two evils, since if these people remain in their villages, and the presence of the agents of Israel there continues, strife will occur and the events of the mountain will be repeated in this area."

At this point, another combatant, Ihab, interrupted his comrade's statement to add his statement to it: "Of course, if this sort of strife occurs here, its results will be much more dangerous than what happened and became conspicuous in the mountain. The Jazzin-Sidon front, which contains the Kafr Falus, 'Ayn al-Mir and La'ba fronts and other positions, is to be considered a strategic position as far as all the villages facing the Israeli enemy go, in the south or elsewhere. It is the only route to the Hasbiya area, and the whole region. However, we made Israel lose a golden opportunity as far as it goes."

At this point Abu Nidal, commander of a battalion in the Kafr Falus front, interrupted, "Our forces are performing the duty of confronting the occupation agents in the area, and we are prepared to cope with all possibilities. We are forces supplementing and complementing the Lebanese national resistance, the resistance which played the basic part in expelling the Israeli army from most Lebanese territories it occupied and insists on following up its holy war and struggle for the sake of freeing all Lebanese soil from the occupation and its agents and mercenaries who are in the east of Sidon, connected directly to the occupation and making up the instruments by which it is attempting to attain its goal, carry out its schemes and realize its ambitions."

Abu Shadi (commander of a position in the Kafr Falus front) supplemented these opinions his comrades expressed with the statement "In fact, we feel that the boundaries of what we are doing go beyond the local framework in the form of a limited military front between us and Lahad's group. We are making a national resistance, and consider that chasing out the occupation agents at the gateway of Jazzin constitutes a crushing blow against Israel with its past, present and future ambitions and schemes. Therefore, we are not surprised to see the enemy pushing large masses toward the Kafr Falus front. This front constitutes the cornerstone by which Israel is trying to apply pressure directly on the Lebanese forces which acted boldly in a manner which surprised the Israelis themselves and involved various types of weapons and confrontation, in the form of sticks and stones, against an occupation force which is thoroughly armed with the most modern, powerful weapons in the world. This front, in accordance with Israeli calculations, also constitutes indirect pressure on the Arab countries, foremost among them Syria. Therefore, we consider that the Kafr Falus front is Israel's gateway in opposition to the Arabs.

"Consequently, the confrontation we are making against this front has clear local and regional dimensions. Israel has repeatedly tried to back Lahad's forces to overrun our positions with the goal of reaching Sidon and has

sought to remain remote (!) from people's attention, in itself, so that it can realize what our comrade has said regarding the Israeli goal, which has the aim of creating strife between the Christians and the Moslems in the area. However, all these attempts ended in failure, because our will to confront is derived from a number of considerations, most prominent of which are:

"Our sacred right to defend our immaculate territory and liberate it from the enemy and its agents.

"Our insistence on preserving the formula of coexistence between Moslems and Christians, in this area and in all areas of Lebanon.

"The clear nature of the struggle we are waging on all political, military and national levels. We are not fighting the Christians on the Kafr Falus front; indeed, we are fighting Lahad's group, which we consider an enemy of the Moslems and Christians alike."

The conversation ended at that point.

The conversation of bullets between the people who were on the Kafr Falus front and those who were on the other side began.

As one of the senior journalists in Lebanon said, "Everyone has his conviction that his struggle is the most proper and the most rightful. The victim in the end is Lebanon, which no longer knows what is 'most proper' and what is 'most rightful.'"

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PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

'ARAFAT COMMENTS ON PLO RELATIONS WITH SYRIA, JORDAN

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 16 Jun 86 pp 8-10

[Interview with Yasir 'Arafat by Fahmi Husayn: "Syrian Intelligence Behind Beirut Massacres"; in Tunis, date not specified]

[Text] Mr Yasir 'Arafat gave an important interview to AL-DUSTUR in which the Palestinian leader revealed information and initiatives that coincide with the escalation of events in Lebanon. He said: "We will not wait for approval to protect our camps in Lebanon" and "we are now and will always assume responsibility toward our masses." He said "the director of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon, Brigadier General Ghazi Kan'an, oversees the massacres committed against our camps in Beirut." He stated that the American initiative for Lebanon was studied in the meeting between King Husayn and President Asad and it provides for the entry of Jordanian troops with Syrian troops into Beirut. Abu 'Ammar emphasized that Lebanon is regarded by the Palestinians as a way station rather than a permanent home and "the only homeland for the Palestinians is Palestine." About Palestinian-Jordanian - Syrian relations, he said "unfortunately things are getting more aggravated between us and the Jordanian authorities and contacts between Syria and us have not yielded positive results." Asked about the so-called "Rashad al-Shawwa plan for autonomy," he said "this is not a plan but an Israeli-American plan in which some Arab sides are involved. It is the same as the Alon plan which has been modified for the worse." He denied that he has asked to speak before the Security Council. "Such a thing is not included on my agenda." He talked about relations between the PLO and the Soviet Union, saying "we are in constant touch with the Soviet leadership to discuss all the various details of current developments. The Soviets put a stop to a crazy foolhardy operation Israel was planning to undertake against Palestinian camps in Sidon and Tyre."

About the Palestinian dialogue and national unity, he said that Syrian intelligence is pressuring certain Palestinian forces in Damascus to dodge and oppose the benevolent pan-Arab Algerian initiative.

These statements were included in the following interview which Mr Yasir 'Arafat, chairman of the PLO executive committee, gave and was published simultaneously by AL-DUSTUR and the Cairo [weekly magazine] ROSE AL-YUSUF.

[Question] Brother Abu 'Ammar, in your communique to the international press you asked Arab leaders to put a stop to massacres in any way they see fit through Arab troops or to help you protect the camps which have been left to the mercy of Amal gangs. How can this be achieved? And have you offered specific proposals in letters to Arab heads of state regarding Arab troops or any other means that can help you protect these camps?

[Answer] The fact is that I have undertaken contacts because I wanted such details to be handled through calm contacts between us and the Arab leaders to face this new ordeal the Palestinians are experiencing in their camps which has developed in recent years to include Muslims in West Beirut where over 250 Lebanese citizens were killed in one day. These victims were Nasirist or Murabitun elements or members of the 6 February Movement, a Nasirist force that was liquidated at the hands of Amal gangs or the 6th Brigade. The most serious consequence of this matter is that Brigadier General Ghazi Kan'an, director of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon, oversees personally with Nabih Birri and for the first time in this round these massacres that took place in Beirut. The design under implementation is twofold: to do away with the entire Palestinian presence in Lebanon, or, in other words, to expel half a million Palestinians from Lebanon to create a new Palestinian refugee problem through which plots can be carried out secretly against the Palestinian people within and without the occupied territory.

[Question] What can the Arab leaders or the Arab nation do to help the PLO to protect these camps?

[Answer] If there is a will, there are many ways to do that. It must be known, however, that we will not wait long to get approval to protect our own people and camps. This is our duty and our responsibility and we ask our brothers to make our job easy. But, and in any case, we are and will in the future assume our responsibility which is made incumbent upon us by our national and pan-Arab duties toward our masses.

[Question] With regard to the Arab summit, are you optimistic about its convocation and have you received any replies from some countries?

[Answer] According to information and inquiries made recently, the Arab foreign ministers' conference, agreed upon in the last session, will be held around the 25th of this month. This council will discuss the date of the next summit which, if contacts between King Hasan II and Mr al-Shazili al-Qulaybi are fruitful, will likely be held at the beginning of next month.

[Question] Following the Palestinian-Lebanese encounter here in Tunis through the meeting of Abu Iyad and President al-Jumayyil, is there a tendency to disptach Palestinian forces to Lebanon?

[Answer] The encounter between Abu Iyad and President al-Jumayyil was a protocol meeting which dealt with problems plaguing the Palestinians in Lebanon and Palestinians carrying Lebanese travel documents in the gulf area. President al-Jumayyil, after this meeting, gave his praiseworthy instructions to revalidate these documents and to include children. This is the greatest special service to Palestinians working in the gulf area.

[Question] I raise this question because that meeting was followed by the evacuation of Palestinian troops from Tunis.

[Answer] The decision to evacuate the troops from Tunis was an old one which we made and carried out a long time ago. We turned over the two Zarqa camps to our Tunisian brothers with our thanks for all the help they had offered these troops through the past years. This Palestinian military move is not confined to Tunis. We move our troops according to plans devised by the leadership and they have nothing to do with events in Lebanon or President al-Jumayyil's visit.

[Question] How do you envisage the future of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon?

[Answer] It must be made known that half a million Palestinians have been living in Lebanon since 1948. Those were taken in as a result of the misfortune that befell the Palestinian people. We regard Lebanon as a way station and not a permanent home. I reiterate these words in facing calls for an alternate homeland, be it in south Lebanon, as has been alleged, or in Jordan. The only homeland for the Palestinians is Palestine. And our only capital is Jerusalem, the first of the two kiblahs and the third Holy Place.

[Question] What in your estimation is likely to develop in Lebanon?

[Answer] King Husayn and President Hafiz al-Asad agreed to submit a plan for sending Jordanian troops into East Beirut to "placate" the Christians and Syrian troops to West Beirut. This plan, carried in Shultz's name by Mr "Gensher" and studied during the meeting of King Husayn and President Hafiz al-Asad, is aimed at controlling the Palestinians, on the one hand, and the Lebanese fundamentalist religious forces, on the other.

[Question] What about the future of your relations with the Shiites?

[Answer] I would like to say that there are attempts to present the fighting in Lebanon as a Palestinian-Shiite fight. My reply to that is that the positions by Lebanese Shiite leaders condemning the aggression against the Palestinian camps speak for themselves. Likewise, statements by Shiite authorities expose and refute this allegation because we hold our Shiite brothers in Lebanon in high esteem as freedom fighters who have stood by us in all crises and are still on our side against the Israeli enemy. Amal is not the Shiite's face, but rather a side donning the sectarian garb to carry out a dubious plot. Even the good elements within Amal itself have declared their refusal to follow this design against our people.

[Question] How far have the efforts to mediate between you and Jordan, on one hand, and you and Syria, on the other, gone?

[Answer] Unfortunately, things between the Jordanian government and us have come to a head, notwithstanding our intent not to get emotional and not to

react in any way out of our belief in the special relationship between the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples and in accordance with the resolutions of our PNC.

As for Syria, the contacts between a number of Palestinian and Syrian officials notwithstanding, the outcome of such contacts was not positive. Furthermore, recent events in Lebanon and flagrant Syrian backing of "Amal gangs" in their attack against Palestinian camps cast their shadow over these contacts.

[Question] Are there contacts with Libya as part of your intent to create or to revive Arab solidarity, particularly since we are on the way to an Arab summit?

[Answer] The situation between the PLO and Libya is different. There are no differences between Libya and us. What we have is a chill in relations. Our relations run hot and cold and are in ebb or flow depending on events. Here I must point out that our position was and still is firm. We are on Libya's side in its resistance to the American criminal aggression against the Libyan people. This has been made perfectly clear through all the political and media positions adopted by the PLO and its leadership.

At the same time we must say that Libya's position on events in Lebanon and on this war and the aggressions against Palestinian camps is a praiseworthy stance for which we thank them, be it at the present time or during previous events experienced by Palestinians in Lebanon.

[Question] Brother chairman of the PLO executive committee, what are your comments on the "Shawwa plan for autonomy?"

[Answer] There is no plan by Rashad al-Shawwa. What we have is an Israeli plan that was presented to him and is represented by an Israeli-American plan that involves certain Arab parties. It is the Alon plan, that has been modified for the worse, for job distribution and civil administration or autonomy in its ugliest distorted form, namely, "cantons" under joint Israeli-Jordanian rule or "condominium."

[Question] A Palestinian dialogue will get underway tomorrow (it took place last week) within the framework of the General Federation of Palestinian Writers and Journalists...

[Answer] This is the second meeting of the preparatory committee which is preparing for the Federation's general conference to be attended by all Palestinian organizations. It is a meeting that reflects the unionist climate in the Palestinian arena. Add to that the fact that Algeria has received the positions of 5 Palestinian organizations endorsing the dialogue and the Algerian initiative. Meanwhile, the 11 Palestinian popular organizations (unions) representing all the various Palestinian popular forces, have sent memoranda to the Algerian government asking it to back and endorse this initiative, Algeria's initiative, calling for a national unity dialogue among the Palestinian revolution's organizations.

We must mention, however, that Syrian intelligence pressures on certain Palestinian forces in Damascus compelled these forces to express their reservations and to dodge and oppose this benevolent pan-Arab Algerian initiative.

[Question] Brother, commander-in-chief of the Palestinian revolutionary forces, what is your assessment of the European position in light of the visible distinction between terrorism and legitimate national liberation struggle?

[Answer] For a long time we have been aware of an evil design being masterminded by the U.S. and Israel against legitimate struggle and Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation and its arbitrary, oppressive, abusive and terrorist practices against the Palestinian people in an attempt to mislead public opinion by confusing this legitimate holy resistance with U.S. overt terrorist actions such as those committed against Libya and the Egyptian plane and against Italian and Yugoslav sovereignty and Israeli-organized state terrorism against our people inside our occupied land and our camps outside it and against Arab countries such as the Israeli raid on PLO headquarters in Tunis, the bombing of the Iraqi reactor, the downing of the Libyan plane with its passengers, the hijacking of an airplane carrying the number two man in Syria and other acts of piracy.

[Question] Are you going to speak before the Security Council?

[Answer] Such a thing is not on my agenda. This was merely a suggestion by some friends that my visit during Security Council debates on the Palestinian question would have positive effects, but my agenda does not include such a visit nor is it under discussion.

[Question] Then what was the reason for the American hubbub?

[Answer] Well, do you know what 'Umar Ibn al-Khattab told a contentious bedouin woman? "Do you not have a spindle with which to occupy your time?" I would like to tell Reagan: "Do you not have a spindle to occupy your time other than Yasir 'Arafat and the PLO?" Unless we have come to represent to the American president an incurable ailment, I would like to tell the American administration that no one can hide the sunlight with his hands.

[Question] Brother Abu 'Ammar, can you tell us about the growth and clear vision of Palestinian-Soviet relations and about your meeting with Gorbachev in the German Democratic Republic?

[Answer] The warm positive encounter between comrade Gorbachev and myself in Berlin silenced and thwarted all attempts to drive a wedge in Palestinian-Soviet relations. Unfortunately, some Arab sides have played this role, but it became certain after that that Palestinian-Soviet relations are too close to be affected by such attempts. Here we must mention the important Soviet position when the Soviet friends, upon informing them during the meeting of our military council in the latter part of last April of Israeli military concentrations in Sidon and Tyre, undertook a friendly and high-principled initiative by sending a peremptory message to stop Israel from undertaking

such a foolhardy adventure which was supposed to coincide with the Amal gangs' attack. The idea was to place the camps in Beirut and the south in the pincers of the Israeli forces and the Amal gangs and their supporters.

This in itself demonstrates the important Soviet role in backing our people on the practical level and not only the political and media levels.

Perhaps I can take this opportunity to thank our Soviet friends and comrade Gorbachev for the friendly position committed to the protection of our camps. We, as you can see, are in constant touch with the Soviet leadership at all levels to discuss various details about ongoing developments in the Middle East and the Palestinian question.

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FATAH COMMANDER EXPOSES FINANCES, CORRUPTION

Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic 11 Jun 86 p 15

[Interview with Abu-al-Za'im by Hasan 'Allam: "What Is Happening Inside PLO Leadership? Story of Machine for Printing Counterfeit Dollars Owned by Abu Iyad. Attempted Sit-In by Fatah Troops in Amman for Withholding Their Paychecks"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Once again Abu-al-Za'im continues to reveal to AKHIR SA'AH the situation following the holding of the Palestinian Military Council in Amman: the individual behavior of Fatah leaders has begun to influence the course of the Palestinian cause. This has been underscored by as yet unpublished records and secret documents. Huge funds available to the PLO have become an instrument of persecution. Fixed policies that safeguard Palestinian people's funds, which are meant to be used in the service of their struggle and interests, have disappeared.

This time, Abu-al-Za'im, the commander-in-chief of the military arm of Fatah, talks about the first PLO contact with Egypt following the siege of Beirut and his role in it. He reveals for the first time the secret of an attempted sit-in by 500 al-Karamah troops stationed in Jordan in front of the Saudi embassy in Amman in response to a PLO decision to withhold their salaries.

He also reveals a number of serious excesses by Fatah leaders on which the curtain has not been dropped.

To begin with, Abu-al-Za'im reveals that "we are now putting the Palestinian house in order whether we exist or not. The stage of struggle in the view of Fatah leaders is business travel, airplanes, airplane tickets and constantly staying at the plushest hotels in the world, as well as buying some of the weakest consciences at news agencies and the mass media. Time will prove that the corrective movement is right and that if we remain silent the revolution will come to an end. We do not have anything to worry about any more for the PLO has turned into a new higher Arab body whose main line is 'tourism by plane,' pure and simple. They do not realize that public opinion is quite aware of that. This age has shortened time and distance and nothing can be concealed any more. The age of hoopla and ballyhoo is over, for this is a waste of their money. Unfortunately, however, this leadership has closed its eyes and ears and has gone astray!

"I have been maligned. I have been accused of being Jordan's lackey and before that, the lackey of Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Syria, and Egypt. Have they forgotten my role in the Cairo contacts when Beirut was under siege?

"I contacted Sa'id Kamal and Abu-al-Tayyib Ahmad Sidqi al-Dajani and told them: 'Convey to President Husni Mubarak this message from the center of the siege: What are you going to do Mr President?' This was the first PLO contact with Egypt. Yasir 'Arafat heard me, the late Sa'id Sayil heard me, Abu Jiyad heard me, and Hani al-Hasan heard me. When Hani al-Hasan tried to interfere, Yasir 'Arafat stopped him saying: Leave him alone, he knows what he wants!

"The next day we sent a message to President Husni Mubarak. Following our departure from Beirut, I went to Egypt to live and contacted Egyptian officials. I said: 'Let us level with each other. We are fully aware that Egypt that was defeated during the era of the Mamlukes and the Tatars and the Mongols wiped out the tails of the crusaders; this is the same Egypt to which Salah-al-Din came. Without Egypt the Arab situation will remain weak.' In Egypt I gave interviews which were published in the press and I was accused at the time of being a Camp David lackey. It is true that my practices are different from those of other Fatah leaders, for I am a man who loves honesty. We used to negotiate with the Lebanese and used to arrive at results. Our accomplishments were achieved before Lebanon was destroyed through numerous agreements signed by me personally, including the 'Cairo' agreement and the (Milkar) agreement. Through such wisdom and good sense, we were able to overcome many ordeals in Lebanon. We cannot disagree with any Arab country because we are a central issue and God bless anyone who wants to take part in it. Those who do not want or cannot take part in it may one day have the chance to do what they can. The Arabs have not spared any efforts, but no one is expected to go beyond one's ability.

"I remember my meeting with Mr Kamal Hasan 'Ali (former prime minister) upon my return to Cairo. After meeting with President Mubarak, Mr Kamal Hasan 'Ali announced that 'Abu-al-Za'im, in his talk with me, said that the only option left to us is the Reagan and Fes initiative and the time has come (in Abu-al-Za'im's words) to translate the Fes plan and to study it thoroughly.'

"As soon as this statement was announced, I was subjected to questioning by Yasir 'Arafat and a large number of Fatah leaders because I had demanded Egypt's return to the Arab ranks. I totally rejected such questioning and refused to appear before a body composed of Khalid al-Hasan, Abu Mazin, and Sakhr Habash. I said those who shook hands with the Zionist leader and had their picture taken with Zionists have no right to question me about shaking an Arab hand that has generously contributed to the Palestinian struggle. No one can deny that Egypt has offered 89,000 martyrs for the Palestinian cause. How can we obliterate the struggle of others?

"Those who are 'courting favor' with Egypt are Egypt's worst enemies."

Withholding the Pay of al-Karamah Forces

Abu-al-Za'im revealed a secret made public for the first time. It is the story of threats by al-Karamah forces in Jordan to stage a sit-in at the Saudi embassy in Amman to protest the withholding of their paychecks by the PLO because of their support for the corrective movement.

[Question] What are the details of the story about the sit-in attempt by al-Karamah forces in front of the Saudi embassy in Amman?

[Answer] The al-Karamah forces are the elite combat forces in Fatah. they are not affiliated with the [Palestine] Liberation Army, but rather are the cream of the 'Asifah forces who were moved from one place to another until they finally settled in Jordan. The most junior fighter among them has at least 10 years of service under his belt. These forces are 500 strong in Jordan, in addition to another 500 abroad.

These forces have lent their full backing to the corrective movement since it announced its program and have indeed proclaimed their support for it. The Fatah leadership was incensed and resolved to retaliate. The first decision was to disband these forces to get them out of the Jordanian arena and disperse them over other arenas. However, these forces rejected the PLO's decision and held on to their unity and cohesion. The Fatah leadership was compelled to resort to another menacing tactic by deciding to withhold their paychecks. This coincided with the onset of the holy month of Ramadan. No one can deny that the needs of any one of us double during this month and that paychecks for any army of any country of the world are issued between the 27th and the 30th of the month. However, the delay in paying the salaries of the al-Karamah forces extended to the 13th day of the month, and therefore these forces decided to counteract the PLO's decision with violence and cunning. A fighter's salary is his only livelihood, so they resolved to resist threats against their daily bread. The first decision these forces adopted was to stage a demonstration and a sit-in in front of the Saudi embassy in Amman and to dispatch "cables" to Saudi princes and Arab kings and presidents. It is a known fact that Arab money is aimed at bolstering the steadfastness of Palestinian fighters and occupied territory residents and not at setting up a Fatah czarist state at the fighters' expense. Moreover, they announced that if their salaries were not paid, they would hold out till the last drop of blood and would back the corrective movement and its goals, regardless of whether their allowances were paid or not.

In the face of such determination, the Fatah czars were forced to pay the salaries shortly before the demonstration was to have marched on the Saudi embassy.

100 Pure Gold Logos

Abu-al-Za'im then disclosed a number of excesses committed by Fatah leaders using the Palestinian people's money.

--100 Fatah logos were made out of pure cast gold, each weighing one kilogram, and distributed by Fatah czars in Arab countries to press and media leaders.

--The PLO donated $600 million to the Tunisian government and paid it $100 million at 1.5 percent interest. Yasir 'Arafat deposited $500 million in the Tunisian Central Bank to bolster the liquidity of Tunisian banks.

--In 1984, following the departure from Beirut, Abu Mazin was given in Tunis a $150,000 wedding sponsored and paid for by Yasir 'Arafat. Show business celebrities from all over the world took part in the occasion and the surprising thing was that Tunisian soldiers guarded the premises. We were hiding our faces in shame before these soldiers who go hungry and had to witness such provocative "extravagance" by this leadership.

--In 1985, at the villa of Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), located on the Mediterranean, at al-Marsah specifically, $40,000 was spent on his silver wedding anniversary celebrations attended by Fatah Central Committee members at the same time that the Palestinian people were "yelping" at Sabra and Shatila inside the camps.

Abu Iyad and Counterfeit Dollars

Many are the crimes committed by Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad). There are records and serious documents that attest to this. I will turn over to you some, but not all, of his offenses including this secret letter sent to him by Midhat Mitwalli, Salah Khalaf's office manager, from his jail. Mitwalli had a disagreement with Khalaf who sent him to jail, hence the letter entreating him and reminding him of his cooperation with him throughout many long years. According to him, he was being tortured and treated like a dog in jail, as per Khalaf's personal orders, despite his cooperation with him in the "arms shipment" which almost caused his arrest by the deterrent forces. In the same letter, he reminded him of a grave secret:

He unknowingly imported a machine for printing counterfeit dollars and took delivery of it as an ordinary machine for Salah Khalaf (when he was office manager). He was compromised when counterfeit dollars were found on the market and he discovered that he had been deluded. When counterfeit dollars were discovered in Cairo markets, the connection was made between them and the counterfeit dollar printing machine that was traced to Salah Khalaf.

I asked Maj Gen 'Atallah 'Atallah Abu-al-Za'im: What about Yasir 'Arafat's firm stand aggainst all these excesses?

Abu-al-Za'im answered: Yasir 'Arafat has never been a man of decision. He does not know the meaning of strategic leadership. He expends all his efforts on "tactics." I challenge Yasir 'Arafat to cite me a single real decision he has adopted. All his decisiosns have been "haphazard." Any decision issued by Faruq al-Qaddumi against him is opposed by Salah Khalaf. The central committee is not homogeneous. I ask Egyptian officials:

How many times has Yasir 'Arafat talked with them and how many issues and resolutions have been reached? Has he ever adhered to anything? How much has he talked with the Jordanians? Has he adhered to anything? How many promises has he given the Iraqis? Has he abided by any position? How much has he talked with the Syrians? Has he committed himself to any decision?

He is a tactical man who lives by trivial causes and avoids central and strategic issues. He also knows how to get out of any difficult situation.

One indication of Yasir 'Arafat's loss of control is the daily contradiction we hear in his statements. He announces his support for the agreement with Jordan only to hear Faruq al-Qaddumi the next day disagreeing with him by saying that the Jordanian agreement was stillborn and that he wanted to turn to Syria. This situation is enough to expose the Palestinian people's condition and weak leadership.

One clear evidence of his loss of control over the leadership is the fact that I have raised important issues in AKHIR SA'AH in an interview in which I raised specific points and asked 'Arafat to reply to them. The unexpected surprise was that Yasir 'Arafat avoided the questions related to excesses, deviations, and mishandling of PLO funds, turning the matter over to a minor individual searching for a role. He is al-Tayyib 'Abd-al-Rahim who is still having a problem with Zuhdi al-Qadrah and Sa'id Kamal regarding his appointment as PLO representative in Cairo. As far as I am concerned, anyone looking for a "role" is not worthy of a reply. Furthermore, he is not a member of the Fatah leadership.

Abu-al-Za'im concluded by saying: "I am a nightmare to the spies, the agents, the traitors, and the parasites among the leaders of the Palestinian people."

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PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

INTERVIEW WITH SALIM SALIH ON ATTEMPTED COUP OF 13 JANUARY

Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD AL-USBU'I in Arabic 22 May 86 p 8

[Interview with Salim Salih Muhammad, assistant general secretary of the Yemeni Socialist Party, by Basimah Nafadhi: "Salim Salih Muhammad Tells AL-ITTIHAD AL-USBU'I the Story of the Events of 13 January, 750 Leadership Elements of the Party Died in the Events"; date and place not given]

[Text] Many in Aden describe him as the strong man in the regime in South Yemen, even though he holds the post of assistant secretary general of the Yemeni Socialist Party. He was among the Politburo members present in the Politburo meeting chamber last 13 January, when machine gun shots echoed through the chamber, after which the terrible civil war in Yemen broke out and continued for 2 weeks in South Yemen.

Upon our arrival at his home, where the assistant general secretary of the party in Democratic Yemen met us--he had been suffering from an illness that had kept him at home for 3 days--we did not find the heavy security guards that we usually see around officials in many countries.

The only manifestations of a guard consisted of a wooden bench big enough for two security guards, though we did not see them.

We went into a rectangular, simply furnished room. As in all Yemeni houses, a few pictures and old-fashioned firearms were hanging on its walls. We found Salim Salih waiting for us, quiet and smiling, apologizing for his illness. It was natural that our questions should be about party matters and about unanswered questions that had received no replies even from the people we had interviewed in Aden concerning the events of 13 January.

[Question] (He appeared surprised when we asked the first question.) What is the real meaning of your being described as the strong man in the regime?

[Answer] (Salim Salih laughed and then replied tersely.) With us, there is no strong man or weak man. There are party organizations, and it is they who set policy and make the decisions to which everyone adheres.

[Question] But the repetition of this description in many newspapers abroad and among diplomats in Aden could not have come out of a vacuum!

(Salim Salih received this comment, too, with laughter and without answering a single word. Since it was obvious that he was averse to entering into this subject, we moved on to other questions.)

[Question] What is the number of party members, and what is the number of cadre members who were subjected to liquidation in the events of January?

[Answer] The number of members of the Yemeni Socialist Party is about 32,000. The number of cadres who were subjected to liquidation was about 750. By cadres I mean fundamental members, such as members of committees belonging to various districts or establishments. The liquidation of 750 of these cadres was a loss for which it is hard to compensate, because party cadres are elements that have been trained over a long period of years. Many of them were highly educated.

[Question] The return of 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il from Moscow to Aden in February of last year was a surprise. What were the circumstances of his return?

[Answer] In reality, we wanted to have a new experiment in political activity. We undertook the merger of three organizations into one organization--not as a front, but actually as one organization. (The three organizations were the National Front, the Popular Vanguard Party, and the People's Democratic Union. They were merged in 1975 into the Unified Political Organization-National Front.)

This was a new experiment in the Third World, where we always find that the principal organization does not grant recognition to the affiliation of the other organizations and does not grant them any opportunity for activity.

Then the Unified Political Organization-National Front became the Yemeni Socialist Party. There came a time when the comrades deemed it appropriate for 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il to resign and leave his position as general secretary of the party. 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il accepted. This, too, was a new experiment and a new situation in political activity, represented by the fact that a person could be president or general secretary and then the day might come when he would become an ordinary citizen.

[Question] What are the forces that pressed for the return of 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il from Moscow?

[Answer] The party.

[Question] Who in the party exactly?

[Answer] The party has its organs, such as the Central Committee, the Politburo, etc. These organs requested of 'Ali Nasir that 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il return. The matter was discussed in various party frameworks, and there was a vote for the return of 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il.

[Question] You were inside the Politburo chamber when the events began with the opening of fire in the chamber. How were you able to get out?

[Answer] The incident began with the entrance of two of 'Ali Nasir Muhammad's guards into the Politiburo chamber while we were assembled, except for 'Ali Nasir and the members loyal to him. One of the guards was carrying 'Ali Muhammad's briefcase; the other was carrying a thermos of tea. The plan was that each would put down what he was carrying and that they would then open fire with their machine guns to liquidate those present. However, what happened was that one of the comrades said to the guard carrying the thermos of tea that the place for the thermos was not the meeting chamber, but rather the secretariat. This guard then became confused, and the other guard hurried and began to shoot from close range directly at 'Ali 'Antar, the deputy chairman of the Supreme People's Council Presidium. Salih Muslih Qasim, the minister of defense, drew his pistol to fire at the guard; but the guard was quicker than he and shot him with his machine gun, so that he fell instantly.

After that, the two guards began to fire at random. We had thrown ourselves down on the ground and had begun to use our pistols to resist. The fighting quickly spread to all the rooms and corridors of the building, between our guards and those of 'Ali Nasir, whose number exceeded 30. Then we heard the voices of some of our guards in the courtyard. We pulled down one of the curtains, tied it tightly, and let it down from one of the windows. We asked our guards for a Kalashnikov rifle, and so we were able to continue resisting. At a certain moment, 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il, 'Ali Salim al-Bid, and myself--we were alone in the chamber--decided to get out by any means. This decision sprang from our 1979 experience in the same place (the clash with Salim Rubayyi' 'Ali). In 1979, the building was subjected to severe bombardment.

When we decided to get out, 'Ali Nasir's guards had received reinforcements. Our guards had also received reinforcements. When we tried to leave, we were fired at. 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il and 'Ali Salim al-Bid went back into the building. I, however, had reached the entrance of the building. There was a group of 'Ali Nasir's guards there; but the leader of the group had been killed, and the soldiers were in a state of confusion and paralysis, not knowing what to do.

Thus, I was able to get out of the building, and I left the place by the back way.

[Question] Reports have mentioned that the Yemeni Socialist Party may hold an extraordinary conference in the near future. Recently, it has become clear that it will prepare for a small-scale conference. Is there a definite date for holding this conference? What are the important issues that the conference will confront and deal with? How do you view the future party and leadership situation in the various frameworks, especially after the liquidation of some people and the flight of others?

[Answer] At its second session, held after the bloody events of 13 January brought about by 'Ali Nasir Muhammad and his group, the Central Committee decided to hold a party conference to evaluate the status of the party in light of the consequences of the bloody events of 13 January and the background of the many-sided conflict. The conference will discuss a number of vital subjects, foremost among which is a critical document that evaluates and

scientifically analyzes the political, class, and ideological context of the bloody events of 13 January, which were the result of methods deviating from the path and principles of the party, methods that 'Ali Nasir Muhammad and his group practiced during their hegemony over the leadership of the party and state.

It is common knowledge that those deviationist methods and practices were the subject of a sharp conflict involving members of our party from top to bottom throughout the last 5 years. Through this struggle, a general party position crystalized and was expressed in a principled tendency faithful to the class and ideological party line. This position was crowned by the conscious and daring resistance to the plot of 13 January, a plot which aimed at weakening the party, turning it into a formal facade, and rending the national unity of the people, as a prelude to deviating from the pursuit of socialism.

Broad political, intellectual, and organizational preparations are now underway for holding the party conference, the date of which will be set shortly by the Central Committee. These preparations include the drafting of the critical analytical document that will strengthen the intellectual and organizational unity of our party. At the same time, the party organizations in the governorates and the armed forces are undertaking broad activity in the area of improving the work of the party, strengthening its internal life, deepening party democracy, securing its unity, and drawing together its ranks on the basis of the platforms by which the party will be guided as it leads the revolutionary process toward socialism in our country. Foremost among these documents are the platform and the internal structure, which are the two basic documents.

In fact, our party has experienced with the turmoil of national and social struggle against the various challenges, plots, and difficulties that confronted our victorious revolutionary movement. It is stronger and sturdier today than at any time in the past, now that its conscious leaders and supporters have been able to thwart the plot of 13 January. With its terrible, bloody method and its ominous goals, this plot represented one of the most dangerous plots to which the revolution has been subjected since its inception. We can say that the party's successful thwarting of this plot and the purging of the plotting elements from among its ranks have constituted a new source for the advancement of the revolution of the party and for the cohesion of its ranks. This will open new horizons for its future development, for the strengthening of its leadership role in society, and for the fulfillment of the socialist tasks of the national democratic revolution.

We are certain that the coming period will witness comprehensive development in the internal affairs of the party, based on the party's great experience and glorious revolutionary traditions consecrated by the blood of thousands of martyrs throughout the various stages of the Yemeni revolutionary movement's growth and development and crowned by the blood of its glorious, history-making leaders, who shone like stars, and of its experienced cadres.

Tribal Loyalties

[Question] The recent events proved that tribal loyalties are still strong and can play a negative role in political life. Is this to be explained as weakness in the role of the party and in the dissolution of tribal loyalties and deepening of the spirit of a single society and state?

[Answer] We can reformulate this inference in another way: that 'Ali Nasir, during the period of his leadership of the party and the state, worked to revive tribal tendencies and rend the national unity of the people.

In fact, our country has achieved great progress since national independence in doing away with many of the legacies of imperialism and of the client system sultanates, by uniting the southern half of the homeland under one government for the toiling classes. Previously, the southern half of the country had been divided into more than 22 sultanates, sheikdoms, and emirates. The revolution also caused profound changes in the class structure of the society and in its economic and social framework. This has strengthened the class unity of the society and the national unity of the people, because of our party's correct national and class policy.

But it is important to point out that the degeneration of the party leadership situation after 'Ali Nasir assumed leadership of the party and state and his divisive methods and destructive activities based on reviving tribal tendencies and using them to protect himself: all of this was about to do grave harm to the unity of the party and the unity of the people. However, our party's success in counteracting the policy followed by the conspirators, frustrating their plots, and correcting the leadership situation will aid continued forward movement along the party path that embodies the national and class interests of the masses of our people.

There is no doubt that correct leadership that seeks inspiration from the party's principles and from its national and class line can further deepen the progressive economic and social changes in society and protect the people's national unity. This will play a role in assuring the future progressive development of the country.

We are certain that our party, which has achieved great successes on this path, will be able, by virtue of its solid unity and creative implementation of its platforms, principles, and goals, to continue moving forward along the path of building a new society and moving toward implementation of socialism. For the sake of this, we struggle and unite our laboring masses, the true beneficiaries of the revolution.

[Question] As is well known, the party and government leadership cadres were completed under exceptional circumstances. Now that political life has stabilized, is there any inclination to review these cadres?

[Answer] The party and state cadres that were elected by the Central Committee of the party and the People's Supreme Council were elected according to the internal ordinance and the constitution for the purpose of running the party

and state apparatus until a party conference is held and a People's Supreme Council elected. There is nothing exceptional in nature about these cadres. The process of their election and the course of their activity and functioning took place and still are taking place in accordance with the provisions of the internal ordinance of the party, the constitution of the country, and the laws and regulations that are in force.

Relations With Ethiopia

[Question] Brother 'Ali Salim al-Bid, general secretary of the party, met in Moscow and Berlin with Mengistu Haile Maryam during the holding of the 27th conference of the Soviet Communist Party and the 11th conference of the United German Socialist Party. What are the results of this meeting, especially since Ethiopia is known to have been sympathetic to 'Ali Nasir Muhammad from the beginning, and since a small number of his elements and followers are still present there?

[Answer] We see the existing relationship between Democratic Yemen and Socialist Ethiopia as a close strategic relationship embodying the vital interests and the common struggle of the Yemeni and Ethiopian revolutions. We are always eager to strengthen and reinforce the pillars of this relationship and to strengthen the bonds of friendship and cooperation between our parties, countries, and peoples; and the Ethiopian comrades share the same desire with us.

Meetings and contacts will continue between leaders of the two parties and countries on various levels during the coming period on the basis of a common struggle and of the common principles and goals of the Yemeni and Ethiopian revolutions.

Relations With Moscow

[Question] During the meeting of Brother 'Ali Salim al-Bid, general secretary of the party, with the Soviet leaders in Moscow, did the Soviet leadership have any specific evaluations of events in Yemen and of the country's future directions?

[Answer] The Soviet leadership has held and still holds a high opinion of our party's sound policy laid down in its platforms. The firm foundations of this line were established in the corrective step of 22 June 1969 and were confirmed by conferences of the Political Organization-National Front, formerly, and by conferences of the Yemeni Socialist Party. It is a path in whose formulation, crystalization, and defense the history-making leaders of the party shared in playing a vanguard and prominent role. Under their leadership, the members of our party and the masses of our people embarked upon an arduous struggle to implement this path at the level of reality, to preserve it, and to oppose all the deviationist practices aimed at the party and at deviating from this path. The last of these was the bloody plot of 13 January, which represented a crude attack on the party's glorious revolutionary path, principles, and traditions.

The solid relations of militancy between our country and the Soviet Union, based on the treaty of freindship and cooperation, will remain the cornerstone in the struggle upon which our party and people are embarking for the completion of the tasks of the national democratic revolution with its socialist horizons and for overcoming all the difficulties that block the progress of our socialist oriented revolution.

[Question] William Casey, director of the CIA, said on 4 April in a speech by him at a conference of the American-Israeli Social Committee that the Soviet Union engineered the events of 13 January in Democratic Yemen, inasmuch as it arranged the return of the "exiles" from Moscow, they being the men who conducted the coup against the former president. This coup, to use his expression, turned into a civil war between forces loyal to former president 'Ali Nasir Muhammad and partisans of the hard-liners from the camp loyal to the Soviets. What is your comment on this?

[Answer] This is another proof of the political and media efforts made and still being made by imperialist and neocolonialist circles with the aim of justifying the coup engineered by 'Al Nasir, who tried initially to blame the leadership of the party for it and to mislead foreign public opinion, which did not at the time know what really happened in our country on the morning of 13 January.

However, the developments that resulted from the plot have made that reality obvious and have convicted 'Ali Nasir of the crime of conducting a coup against the party.

The truth is that these insolent slanders by the American intelligence man and earlier slanders by imperialist-reactionary political and media circles during the events not only reveal the sympathy, collusion, and support of these circles for the bloody plot of 13 January that served their goals, but also expresses the conceivable level of enmity that the American administration and its intelligence circles harbor toward the leadership of our party. At the same time, they unmask the attempts of imperialist circles to destroy our progressive regime.

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CSO: 4404/358

AUSTRIAN PAPER INTERVIEWS NAJIBULLAH

AU241401 Vienna VOLKSSTIMME in German 22 Jun 86 pp 3-4

[Interview given by Mohammad Najibollah, general secretary of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, to correspondent Otto Janecek on 11 June--place not given]

[Text] [Janecek] Comrade Najibollah, you are the new general secretary of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan [PDPA]. What was the reason for the change in the party leadership?

[Najibullah] As you know, the April Revolution brought revolutionary power to the working people in the country. Since then the revolution has been developing. The consolidation of the Revolutionary process, in particular since the introduction of the new evolutionary phase, has set specific tasks for the PDPA nad the Afghan state organs.

For instance: When the revolution was victorious the party had 18,000 members, today it has 150,000. Membership of the socialist organizations has increased at a similar pace. Today they have 760,000 members.

The holding of the first democratic elections, the consolidation of state power in the local organs, and the plans' prospects have considerably increased the extent of the work of the Revolutionary Council. Today, enormous working activity and universal mobility are necessary.

Therefore, the 18th plenary meeting of the PDPA Central Committee decided to separate the duties of the general secretary and the president of the Revolutionary Council. The plenary meeting acceded to the request of Comrade Babrak Karmal to absolve him from the post of PDPA Central Committee general secretary. Comrade Karmal's state of health was also a reason for that. Comrade Karmal continues to be president of the Revolutionary Council (state president) of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

[Janecek] At the moment the party is trying to widen the basis for the April Revolution. Can you tell us something about the successes?

[Najibollah] With the support of the overwhelming majority of the Afghan people, the April revolution was victorious. The breakdown of the feudal

monarchy was welcomed. But in the first phase of the revolution big mistakes were made. And there were also the conspiracies of reaction and the undeclared war of imperialism. Finally, there was also the betrayal by Amin and his attempts to split the party. A great number of people were then estranged from the revolution.

With the victory of the new evolutionary phase of the revolution, practical steps were taken to again guarantee the active participation of the masses.

The National Fatherland Front, for instance, comprises all mass organizations, tribes, and nationalities in the country and plays an important role in bringing about a consensus. By holding local elections, our working people have started to participate in administration on a local level. The process will be concluded in all provinces at the end of this year. We are working on a constitution for the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan which provides for even bigger possibilities for people's participation in the dealings of the State Council and the Council of Nationalities. The historic Loya Jirga (council assembly) of the Afghan people and the Jirga of the border tribes last year were a constructive step in mobilizing the national-democratic forces and in strengthening the basis of the revolution.

Now about 100 deputies who are not party members represent the people in the Revolutionary Council (160 members). Some tens of thousands of people who escape the influence of hostile propaganda put down their weapons and joined the revolutionary power. Many people who operated with the counterrevolution from foreign countries have returned home and actively participate in building Afghan society.

In addition to this, there is the cultural revolution. About 150,000 of our fellow countrymen who were illiterate have learnt to read and write. Some tens of thousands of peasants became land owners and have united in agricultural producer cooperatives and actively defend the revolution.

The complicated defense system of our militia armed forces gets stronger and stronger. On the other hand, the masses' trust in the revolutionary power is also increasing, the living standard of the people is improving.

The esteem of the PDPA constantly increases. Today we have friendly relations with 135 parties and international organizations, and diplomatic relations with 81 countries in the world.

[Janecek] Western newspapers write that the process of land reform has slowed down, because the peasants are afraid to take land. Is that correct?

[Najibollah] The democratic land and water reform is a central task of our national democratic revolution. It is an old wish of the great masses of the peasants in our country. With the start of the new evolutionary phase of the revolution the original mistakes in the land and water reform were eliminated.

The implementation of the democratic land reform was something that could not be implemented immediately. The distribution of land to peasants must be

combined with other questions. For instance, with the supply of water, with the provision of seed and chemical fertilizers, with making available agricultural machines and credits to the peasants. Although an undeclared war is waged against us, the land reform is being continued. During the years 1984-85 more than 10,000 families received land, and then more than 10,000 again. In the course of last year the distribution of land was 123 percent above the intended aims. Compared to the prerevolutionary years agricultural production has increased by 7.6 percent. This shows that the statements of the Western media are absurd.

[Janecek] Can you explain to our readers the role of the so-called Jirgas within the framework of the new Afghan society?

[Najibollah] Jirgas have a long tradition in our country. The Afghan people have repeatedly solved important national and international questions through such council assemblies. Since the April Revolution the Jirgas have been put onto a new revolutionary level so to speak.

Thus, the Loya Jirga of April last year (1500 delegates participated in it) was a great event. At this Jirga national problems were discussed in a completely free way. It sanctioned the domestic policy and the foreign policy of the party. It confirmed the friendship with the Soviet Union and decided to take measures at the borders and stop the infiltration of gangs from foreign countries.

It was followed by the Jirga of the border tribes, in which 3,700 delegates participated. At this the fraternal tribes and nationalities once again undertook the obligation to defend the country and the borders in view of the undeclared war and the infiltration of counterrevolutionaries.

Today Jirgas are to be seen in a new light. Today, unlike earlier, the working masses representing all classes and democratic strata elect their delegates in democratic processes. Today, Jirgas have an important place in the political system of the country as a manifestation of democracy. Therefore, the role of Jirgas will also increase as a form of self-administration of tribes and nationalities.

[Janecek] The USSR and Afghanistan have agreed on a timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops if there is a political solution. Can you imagine such a political solution with Pakistan (and with the counterrevolutionaries operating from there, with American imperialism, and so on)?

[Najibollah] I want to state that the two sides participating in the Geneva negotiations at the moment are the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and Pakistan. There are negotiations going on between independent and sovereign states. Now, concerning the last round of these negotiations, a political solution seems to be possible.

Afghanistan is striving for a solution that is in the interest of our people. But not only that, also in the interest of all peoples of the region. We want to help the cause of peace and stability in the region and throughout the world

to be successful. As far as the United States is concerned, it must be one of the guarantors of noninterference in the internal affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Therefore, it must not undertake any measures against the agreements that will probably be concluded in Geneva.

[Following the interview the paper states: "In a talk following the interview Comrade Najibollah asked that his thanks be conveyed to the progressive forces in Austria for the solidarity with the struggle of the revolutionary forces in Afghanistan"]

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CSO: 4620/51

INDIA

'PACKAGE DEAL' RUMORED PLANNED FOR INDO-PRC TALKS

New Delhi PATRIOT in Engish 10 Jun 86 p 1

[Article by Cecil Victor]

[Text] The Chinese are trying to wrap an enigma round a puzzly by apparently abandoning the "package deal" by reasserting claims to 90,000 sq kms of land in the eastern sector well in time for the seventh round of boundary talks with India.

The "package deal" announced via such unofficial couriers as Dr Subramaniam Swami, formerly of the Janata Party, when he visited Beijing some years ago envisaged an acceptance by China of the MacMahon Line in the eastern sector (Arunachal Pradesh) in return for concessions by India in the western sector (Aksai Chin).

Again through unofficial channels (this time through a team of visiting Indian journalists) Beijing has given the impression that it is resiling from its earlier position. It now wants India to give up something in the eastern sector as well. China has not cared to explain why it does not accept the watershed principle for defining the border with India though it has has implemented it in the settlement of the border issue with Burma?

In Arunachal Pradesh China is still sitting on the heights of Thag La and Longju and in Aksai Chin the Chinese have occupied about 14,500 sq kms of Indian territory and about 2,000 sq kms held in small pockets in the central sector. This is the border situation as it obtains today.

Vice Foreign Minister Liu Shu Quing, who is the chief Chinese negotiator in the Sino-Indian border talks, has gone to the extent of saying that former Premier Zhou Enlai's proposal of 1960 was more an enunciation of ideas than a specific proposal. If it is a ploy merely to jolt the Indian side to prepare itself psychologically to make concessions in the next round of sector-by-sector talks in Beijing in July than it is somewhat ill-conceived. Before Mr Liu chose to offer his new line of thought it was assumed by some China-watchers in Delhi that Beijing would help create conditions for raising the talks to a higher, political level. His latest observations have proved that these assumptions were nothing more than wishful thinking.

China is back to its old position that if the boundary question proves intractable then it could be skirted and Sino-Indian relations "normalised" by other means. This displays amazing insensitivity to the Indian stand that the settlement of the border issue is crucial to normalisation of relations between the two countries. India remains committed to the position that no one should be allowed to enjoy the fruits of aggression.

/13104
CSO: 4600/1839

POSSIBLE GORBACHEV OCTOBER VISIT DISCUSSED

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 15 Jun 86 p 1

[Text] Moscow, June 14 —Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachyov on Saturday told the visiting Indian Foreign Affairs Minister P Shiv Shankar that he was looking forward to visiting India and meeting Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi "at the earliest".

The meeting between the two leaders, which took place in the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee building instead of Kremlin, lasted about two and a half hours.

Mr Shiv Shankar, who is here on a "brief working visit" and will leave for New Delhi tomorrow evening, revealing this to Indian newsmen said that his impression was that Mr Gorbachyov will visit India "some time in October or November".

He said he was impressed by Mr Gorbachyov's appreciation of India's role in general and that of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in particular in promoting world peace and easing global tension.

During the talks, Mr Shiv Shankar said, Mr Gorbachyov appreciated the steps that the Indian Government was taking in solving complex domestic socio-economic and political issues.

Mr Gorbachyov made particular mention of the tested policies of Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi that the present leadership was following in strengthening India's unity, easing world tensions and for acquiring lasting peace and stability in the international arena.

He also appreciated India's role in the Non-Aligned Movement and efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament by the leaders of the six countries.

The talks, the Indian External Affairs Minister said, took place in warm and cordial atmosphere and covered different topics including international and South Asian scenes and also widening and diversifying Indo-Soviet friendship. Mr Shiv Shankar delivered to Mr Gorbachyov a message from Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.

During the talks with Soviet External Affairs Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, Mr Shiv Shankar said the issue of US attack on Libya came up prominently. The two sides particularly mentioned the different training centres for terrorists in different parts of the world and expressed concern over the issue.

Mr Shiv Shankar said both on international and regional issues "there was complete agreement" and "unanimity". On Pakistan there was a "factual appraisal" of the situation.

Mr Shiv Shankar also said that Mr Shevardnadze has agreed to visit India 'in principle' but no date has been set.

/13104
CSO: 4600/1847

LANDSLIDE VICTORY FOR LEFT FRONT IN CALCUTTA POLLS

Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 16 Jun 86 p 1

[Text] **Calcutta, June 15: The CPI(M)-dominated Left Front today swept the municipal polls in most of the districts in the state as the results, which continued to pour in till late in the night, went in favour of the Front candidates. The Congress(I), the main contender of the Left Front, has been able to form boards only in six municipalities, while the rest were captured by the Front partners.**

The Left Front has scored a landslide victory capturing 55 of the 67 municipalities the results of which were available till midnight tonight, according to the state minister for urban development and local self-government, Mr Prasanta Sur.

The Congress(I) received the strongest jolt at Bally in Howrah district where it could win only two of the 25 wards. The WBPCC(I) president, Mr Priya Ranjan Das Munshi, told The Telegraph tonight that he would inquire into the party's poor performance in the Bally municipal polls. "I smell some conspiracy on the part of the Left Front government since a large number of voters were not allowed to exercise their franchise," he said.

Mr Das Munshi conceded that the trends of the results indicated a victory for the Left Front. He, however, dismissed reports that he might step down in view of the municipal poll results. "I will meet the concerned district presidents to find out the reasons for the poor performance," he said.

The only district where the Congress(I) has fared comparatively well is Murshidabad. The party was able to form boards in Berhampore and Jangipur municipalities. At Jiaganj, the party won 6 wards, the CPI(M) 4 and Independents 4. The Left Front, however, captured the Murshidabad municipality where the Congress(I) won 5 seats against the Front's 6.

The Congress(I) experienced a near rout in Hooghly district where it captured only the Serampore municipality. Of the remaining 10 municipalities, six went to the Left Front while counting was going on in four others. The municipalities captured by the Left Front are Chinsura, Bansberia, Arambagh, Tarakeswar, Champdani, Uttarpara and Chandannagore. The Left Front also achieved considerable success in Midnapore district, capturing five of the six municipalities results of which have been declared so far. The Congress(I) won only the Tamluk municipality. The Left Front also captured all the three municipalities in Burdwan district—Kalna, Daihat and Raniganj.

In Birbhum district, the Left Front captured the Rampurhat and Bolpur municipalities, while the Congress(I) won control of the Suri civic body. In North Bengal, Jalpaiguri, Old Malda, Dinhata in Cooch Behar district all went to the Left Front.

The Congress(I) also failed to capture a single municipality in North and South 24-Parganas till late tonight. The Left Front has already captured Gobardanga, Kamarhati, South Dum Dum and

Bhatpara municipalities. According to Left Front sources, the Front was in the process of winning Baranagar, Kharda, Titagarh, Naihati, Barrackpore, North Barrackpore, Garulia and Dum Dum municipalities. Bongaon municipality has, however, gone to the Congress(I). A tie between the Congress(I) and the Left Front-SUCI alliance was reported at the Jainagar-Majilpur municipality in South 24-Parganas.

According to state Congress(I) sources, the poor performance of the party was largely due to the "wrong selection of candidates."

Another section of party leaders, however, did not rule out sabotage by the disgruntled elements. The expulsion of Mr Pranab Mukherjee from the Congress(I) is believed to have taken its toll. The CPI(M), however, felt the Congress(I)'s debacle wad due to a steady erosion of its influence in the urban areas because of its continued infighting and failure to present any positive programme to the people. Both the sides conceded that the votes were totally polarised between the Congress(I) and the Left Front and that dit ident nominees failed to mak any impact.

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CSO: 4600/1848

INDIA

BORDER SECURITY FORCE TO MAN SENSITIVE AREAS

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 15 Jun 86 pp 1, 13

[Article by Law Kumar Mishra]

[Text] THE Border Security Force (BSF) has taken over command of all the 18 posts manned till recently by the Gujarat police in the border areas of Kutch district.

Under the border security reorganisation scheme, covering sensitive border districts, the Union home ministry had directed the state to withdraw its police from these border posts. Hitherto, either the SRP or the Kutch police were guarding these entry points, called border police posts.

It is learnt that similar arrangements have been made in other districts along the India-Pakistan border to make protection effective and without much involvement of the local police.

The 18 border posts handed over to the BSF are Khavda near the India bridge, Lakhpat, Udan, Hajipir, Dhordo, Awarapur, Bela, Kotda, Dinara, Itara, Bhare Buri, Akri, Medhi, Butav, Lachatter, Laki and Dhoravira. Some of these were in existence even during the erstwhile Kutch state and some were created during the 1965 war to check infiltration of Pakistanis.

CAMPS OPENED

New BSF camps have been opened and one more battalion has been deployed in the area. Under the new arrangement, the powers of the state police have been restricted to civilian purposes. On the other hand, the strength of the central intelligence agencies is being raised and the post of a deputy superintendent (CBI) has been created for Kutch district.

According to the Centre's instructions, all offences committed 80 kms within the border limits, including smuggling and illegal trafficking, will be investigated by the CBI.

The Union minister of state for internal security, Mr. Arun Nehru, has instructed the chief minister to take effective steps to prevent infiltration of aliens and arms from the Kutch side. The government of India had fixed April 19 as deadline for the reorganisation.

The state government had recently increased the strength of the police for intensified patrolling in the remote and thinly populated villages in Kutch. One police sub-division at Nakht Rana and one circle at Naliya have been created in addition to five new police stations at Narayan Sarovara, Nara, Zekhov, Vayur and Kothara.

HASTY STEP

Three new outposts at Hajipir, Itara and Dhordo have also been created. All these new police units had to be opened in rented buildings owing to the hurried decision. All these places are in the extreme fringe, from where it is hardly a night-long journey either by camel or boat to Pakistan.

During the drive launched against infiltrators, 86 Pakistanis have so far been arrested from different border villages in Kutch. Nine Pakistan-made arms have also been seized from the illegal entrants, according to Mr. R. B.

Srikumar, the district superintendent of police.

The district police have recommended to the collector action against the erring revenue officials concerned. Many of the Pakistanis, who had strayed into Kutch, had secured ration-cards in their names.

A close watch is also being maintained on the coastal areas of Bhuj and neighbouring Jamnagar districts. At Bedi and Salaya ports; some 300 people were detained by the police from different vessels after they were reportedly deported by Gulf countries. They were arrested and released for the Passport Act offences.

Most of them told the police that they had gone to the Gulf in search of jobs and claimed that they were from Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and Punjab. Their bonafides are being investigated.

INTENSE VIGIL

In September last, on the eve of the Punjab elections, the entire Indo-Pakistan border was handed over to the army and the movement of civilians in the 80-km zone within the border was restricted. Army helicopters used to patrol the bordering villages round the clock. The army was in the command of the border areas for two months.

The BSF, under the new arrangement, has intensified vigilance on the Kutch border — from Akali in the west to Bela in the east. Surveillance in the Kori creek, Narayan Sarovar and the Rann of Kutch has also been enhanced.

There had been no large-scale infiltration of Pakistanis in the last few months. It is stated the police had arrested three panchayat presidents of three talukas in Kutch for harbouring Pakistanis and for indulging in smuggling.

Four Pakistanis, who were arrested at Lakhpat village in the district last September, had confessed to the police that information regarding the movements of the army and the BSF was being leaked out regularly.

A proposal to issue identity cards like the arrangement across the border is being considered actively by the government.

Meanwhile, the chief minister, Mr. Amarsinh Chaudhry, has asked senior police officials to identify places where check-posts can be set up in the state. These are likely to be located on the Gujarat's borders with Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan as well as highways in Baroda and Bulsar districts.

The chief minister also recently convened a meeting of district officials and asked them to keep a watch on the entry of suspected terrorists and bank robbers.

/13104
CSO: 4600/1845

INDIA

CORRESPONDENT INTERVIEWS WORLD BANK PRESIDENT

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 15 Jun 86 pp 1, 9

[Interview with A.W. Chausen by J.N. Parimoo; date and place not given]

[Text] IN these difficult times, Indian economic management has proved to be excellent and in the developing world today India is undoubtedly "number one", according to the World Bank president, Mr. A. W. Clausen.

In an interview, on the eve of his retirement, Mr. Clausen looked back and answered some questions raised by critics about his five-year term as the president of the bank. He had high praise for the pace and direction of Indian economic development. He thought that as part of a new phase in growth, important changes were under way in India: there was going to be a shift in emphasis, from agriculture to efficient industrial production and export promotion and a policy shift towards the private sector.

The five years of Mr. Clausen's bank presidentship have mostly been turbulent years of economic crisis — high interest rates, double digit inflation, stagnant aid flows, declining commodity prices and international trade and mounting debt burdens of developing countries.

The criticism against Mr. Clausen is broad: at one end of the spectrum are those who believe that, under his stewardship the bank dictated politically inconvenient adjustment policies to helpless heavily indebted countries and thus interfered with their sovereignty and that the bank's policy lending was aimed at demolishing the state sector and countering the socialistic economic growth in the developing world.

At the other end are President Reagan's policy advisors some of whom believe that "Tom" Clausen did not do enough, that bank lending continued to be project-oriented and that in solving the debt crisis the bank did not support the policy prescriptions of the monetary fund.

PLEASING AMERICA

In the interview Mr. Clausen tried to answer some of these questions: did he feel pushed and pressured by the Reagan administration? By insisting on privatisation was the bank not serving as an instrument of capitalism to counter growth of socialism in the developing world? In the name of "growth with adjustment", was not the bank dictating politically inconvenient policies to poor indebted countries and thus interfering with their sovereignty?

Though Mr. Clausen evaded straight answers to some of the inconvenient questions, his replies did suggest that he had tried to steer the bank on the middle course, keeping the largest shareholder of the bank, USA, pleased on the one hand and responding to the concerns of the sensitive and assertive leadership of the developing world on the other.

On July 1, Mr. Barber Conable, an American politician from New York state, takes over from Mr. Clausen. The 63-year-old Republican, who has 20 years of parliamentary experience at the Capitol Hill, is known for his negotiating skill and is expected to persuade Congress to provide more funds for the World Bank.

Asked what advice he would like to give to his successor, Mr. Clausen said he would like Mr. Conable to realise that, at the bank, U.S. view is not the only view and that bank decisions generally represent a compromise of a wide range of differing standpoints.

Asked what was his biggest disappointment as the World Bank presi-

dent, Mr. Clausen said the most frustrating singular disappointment was the inadequate funding of IDA-7, which was reduced from twelve billion dollars to nine billion dollars.

The following is a summary of the questions asked and the answers given by Mr. Clausen:

Question: Critics say that during your time the World Bank became a missionary force to spread Mr. Reagan's supply side doctrine. What is your comment?

Clausen: I would say the World Bank has long laboured in the vineyards of the supply side — long before "supply side" became an interesting code word. So I would debate the suggestion that I instituted supply side in the bank. On the contrary, the track record of the bank for the last 50 years is an epitome of supply side economics. We do not think of ourselves as supply siders. We are a growth institution, have been and will continue to be so.

Question: But side by side, there has been an emphasis on privatisation which has served to counter the growth of socialism in the developing world. The bank has become an instrument of political change. Don't you think so?

Clausen: An institution that is owned by 149 countries has no political ideology. We are not in favour of the private sector in contrast to public sector. We are in favour of efficiency, whether it is in the state sector or the private sector. During the last 40 years, there has been an awful lot of intervention, particularly in the newly-independent countries. The government has been the only business in town. In most of these countries there was no private sector. But now, because of the debt crisis these countries have become aware that they can attract equity investment (and technology) if they mobilise private savings and create an environment of growth for the private sector. If developing countries could unleash the power and drive contained in private entrepreneurship that would speed up their growth. In our policy dialogue with governments that is a focus of our attention.

INDIA'S REPRESENTATIVE

Question: Talking of this policy dialogue, our finance minister, Mr. V. P. Singh, has said there is a growing feeling in the developing world that in the name of adjustment, the bank is imposing politically inconvenient policies on helpless debt-ridden countries and thus interfering with their sovereignty. What is your response?

Clausen: Well I would argue that the bank's relationship with developing countries is that of partnership. We are a non-political and purely professional group of international civil servants. We give advice to governments. It is for them to accept or discard such advice. But even so, the weight of our experience shows that a project in a country will deliver a bigger payload if the policy framework in the country is more conducive to creation of wealth and has fewer disincentives to growth and if the allocation of resources is efficient. As an institution owned by 149 countries we owe it to our member governments to tell them what policies would produce better results. But there is no politics in it. It is sheer pragmatism.

I travelled in India as recently as last August. I travelled with your excellent representative (on the bank's board of directors), Mr. Krishnaswamy Rao saheb. He makes a very good contribution to our board's deliberations and there is no way we can force him or any government to do anything.

Question: You say the bank represents a highly professional international management service. How much of this service is used as a facade by the countries that have the voting power — a facade for furthering their policies.

Clausen: I would say my five years experience is that we are non-political. We listen to all shareholders, big or small. No single shareholder dominates but nevertheless we do try to accommodate the views of our larger shareholders in the same way as is done in a business corporation. I would not however deny your suggestion that there is an attempt to politicise the decisions of the bank. I would be wrong to deny that but such attempts are few and far between.

There are no perfect solutions to highly complex issues. When we have an impasse we have to make a compromise. But never a compromise on principles. Going back to your earlier reference to my good friend, your finance minister, I would like to say we do not invade national sovereignties. It is the country's development priorities that are implemented, not our priorities.

Question: Don't you think your success at the bank would have been more outstanding if you had in the White House a president like Lyndon Johnson or John Kennedy and not Ronald Reagan?

Clausen: It is true that during the 'sixties and particularly in the 'seventies, the U.S. posture was more towards multilateral aid. In the decade of 'eighties the pendulum has swung a bit too much towards bilateral aid. In the World Bank we have great admira-

tion for the effectiveness and force that comes from multilateral aid.

Question: Over a year ago there were newspaper reports that the White House was not happy with you because it was felt that your bank did not provide adequate support to monetary fund efforts to meet the debt crisis. My question is did you feel pressured and pushed by the White House?

BAKER INITIATIVE

Clausen: Ah, no I did not feel any push. I felt rather constrained in doing what I and my colleagues in the management felt we should be doing. The comparison between the fund and the bank is not fair. The economic crisis that emerged in the early 'eighties could be solved only by the fund. The bank's role is long term while the funds focus is immediate. The fund is like the doctor: The earlier you go to it with your illness the easier it is to treat it. I know that there was an awareness that we in the bank were just sitting and doing nothing though all this while we had been saying that the real solution to the debt problem lay in growth — adjustment with growth.

The roles of the fund and the bank are different. The horizons are different. And yes we were bothered when you guys in the media were asking the question, "We see the fund but where are those guys from the bank? They are not doing anything." From the very first speech I made as bank president I focussed on growth. There had earlier been no focus whatever. Now there is a consensus. I give credit to my friend, the secretary of treasury, Mr. Baker, for what has come to be known as Baker initiative. It is an initiative that is strongly supported by the bank and the fund.

Question: But critics inside the Reagan administration say that the bank bureaucracy has by tradition been oriented to project lending and that it cannot co-operate with the Baker initiative. It has been suggested that the Reagan administration expects that your successor, Mr. Conable will have to make drastic changes at the senior levels of the bank staff. The name of your senior vice-president, Mr. Stern is being mentioned in this connection.

CAPITAL INCREASE

Clausen: I think that is an unfair criticism. I would argue very strongly on the opposite side of that. Our policy-based lending in 1981 was about three per cent of the total lending and in the fiscal year '86 policy lending is expected to be 18 per cent. When we discussed the role of the bank, some months ago, the unanimous conclusion of the board of governors was that the principal activity of the World Bank should be project-lending.

There was another conclusion, but it was not unanimous, namely that there is room for some more policy-lending. Where is the question of bank staff being non-co-operative when it is the conclusion of the board of governors? Project-lending has been and will continue to be the bread and butter of the bank. The criticism is unfair particularly when it is personalised.

Question: You are reported to have said that there would be a general increase in the bank's capital next year. What makes you so confident when you know that some countries have been putting this off year after year.

Clausen: I did not just pick a year (1987). Our calculations of our lending requirements for the next year have shown that there will have to be a general increase in the capital. The Reagan administration has said that it will agree to an increase if the bank management proves that there is need for such an increase. So I am confident that there will have to be an increase next year.

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KHAMENE'I CALLS ON PEOPLE TO END WAR DECISIVELY

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 12 June 86 p 2

[Text] Yesterday President Hojjat ol-Eslam Khamene'i discussed our country's plans concerning the imposed war and its final stages. While stressing the participation of all classes at the fronts and the use of all resources for the war, he announced: We are trying to settle the war.

The Chief of the Supreme Defense Council gave an interview to the VOICE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN in which he discussed the policy of world imperialism and the supporters of the Iraqi regime concerning the war, as well as the Islamic republic's direction in this regard. He said:

The analysis of all persons who are involved with war affairs has been and is that the policy of world imperialism and the supporters of the Ba'th regime is to prolong the war. The reason for this is the despair of the Arab Sheikhs of a victory for Iraq and their inability to impose peace on us.

The only course open to them is therefore to prolong the war so that we will be caught up in war problems and that we will also not have the miraculous effects of the movement of the combatants of Islam.

The president said: Our policy is to settle the war. The participation of all the people is necessary to achieve this. One cannot rely only on the armed forces and officials, and one must not overlook the great resources the people have, and their zeal and desire. For this reason the Imam has made it everyone's duty to go to the fronts.

Hojjat ol-Eslam Khamene'i noted: Since today the country's primary and immediate concern is the war, I consider it necessary that we put all of the country's resources into the war. Mobilizing forces and resources, we must strive, God willing, to settle the war, and we will do this.

The Chief of the Supreme Defense Council discussed the reserve obligation to take part in the war. He said: When the Imam said that it is obligatory for the people to take part in the war, the great movement of popular forces was such that officials thought the country's organizations and facilities would be shut down. We therefore asked the Imam if the people's participation at the fronts is a reserve or an unconditional obligation, and he said it is a reserve obligation. After that the concerned organizations were obligated to answer the swarms of volunteers by saying we will not reject any person volunteering for the fronts, but we will not allow them to be sent definitely and immediately to the front. These forces will be sent to the fronts as needed.

The president discussed the organization that determines whether there are sufficient forces at the fronts or not. He said: The Khatem al-Anbiya Compound, which is responsible for managing the war, and the revolutionary guards, who organize and mobilize, are the officials who answer us in this regard, and actually this is determined by the revolutionary guards. The Chief of the Supreme Defense Council discussed the way in which volunteers report to be sent to the front. He said: Volunteers must report to revolutionary guard centers and fill out assignment forms. On the basis of these forms, which determine the assignments of volunteers, the revolutionary guards organize forces, and I myself am also filling out one of these forms.

The president addressed himself to the Muslims of our country, saying: We must bring the war to a desirable and proud conclusion, and this is the responsibility of everyone who can go to the war and the fronts, and take part on the front lines, at the rear echelons, and in support.

The president stressed: This is the public responsibility of the nation of Iran, and everyone in the nation must take part in this historic experience.

He added: Today our capacity to work and learn is much greater than it was in the past, and the revolutionary guards are ready to organize all of the great forces of the people.

The president then filled out a form published by the revolutionary guards for popular volunteer forces for assignment and travel to the fronts.

9310
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FUTURE OF RELATIONS WITH SYRIA DISCUSSED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 2 Jun 86 pp 12-13

[Article by 'Ali Nuri Zadeh; place and date not specified]

[Text] "During the last 5 years whenever we asked Damascus to keep its commitments to Iran either to pay installments on its debts or furnish us with more offensive weapons, the Syrian regime had its information media write about the possibility of normalizing relations between Baghdad and Damascus. And every time we had first to withdraw our requests in order to prevent them from agreeing to plans for mediation between Syria and Iraq, after which we would give them a bribe to continue to stand with us. In 1985 we sent them Shaykh sa'id Sha'ban, our Tripoli ally, after we learned that Syrian and Iraqi officials were about to arrange a meeting in Riyadh and we agreed to postpone for nine more months the date for paying their debts to us. At the beginning of the year and after we saw al-Asad and al-Husayn holding hands, we informed the Syrians that we were prepared to grant them a fresh postponement for paying their debts. However, they asked us for the 'head of Hizballah' in Lebanon and the 'resumption of the shipment of oil' to them, in addition to requesting a 4-year delay for Syria to prepare a debt repayment schedule. This time we refused their request and sent with our new ambassador to Damascus, Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohammad Hasan Akhtari, a 5-point document dealing with the future of our relations with Damascus. If Damascus agreed to these points, we would be willing to continue our alliance. Otherwise, it would be impossible for one-sided love to continue."

This is what an Iranian newsman heard from President 'Ali Khamene'i, who in the course of his meeting with a number of Iranian newsmen in his office on 10 May described some of the misfortunes suffered by Iran at the hands of the Syrians due to the way they have chosen to deal with Iran.

According to this Iranian newsman, President Khamene'i explained that the Islamic Republic is unwilling to tolerate the pressures being applied to it by Damascus every time Tehran asks for explanations of Syrian foreign policy.

The newsman added that Khamene'i was extremely frank when he said to the editor-in-chief of KAYHAN AL-'ARABI: "It is up to you to serve as a bridge between us and the Arabs and explain to your readers that we have lost patience with Damascus' policy. We are not prepared to offer new bribes to al-Asad to preserve our friendship."

In the Iranian Parliament

Khamene'i's remarks were followed by a bitter debate in the parliament between his unofficial bloc and Hojjat ol-Eslam Rafsanjani's bloc in the Majlis about the future of Syrian-Iranian relations. While Rafsanjani's bloc tried to ignore Syria's failure to keep all its commitments in its relations with Tehran, Khamene'i's bloc did not miss the opportunity to attack Syria. Then besides deputy Fu'ad Karimi who openly attacked Syria, Dr Hasan Ruhani, chairman of the defense committee in the Majlis, referred to unfaithful friends "who have been exploiting the weaknesses of the Iranian government and carrying out a policy of swindling and indirect threats the last 5 years by hinting at the withdrawal of their support for us. These friends must realize that the policy of swindling lost its effectiveness after we succeeded in reaching Faw!"

Then have Syrian-Iranian relations gotten to such a critical point that their improvement requires Syria to offer concessions to Iran--in Lebanon or on the rapprochement with Jordan?

To answer these questions, we must first learn the contents of the message that Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohammad Hasan Akhtari brought to Damascus, which agreed to accept him after it refused three others whom Tehran nominated as Iranian ambassador in the Syrian capital.

It will be recalled that this post remained vacant for 9 months after Damascus requested that Tehran replace Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohtashemi, currently minister of the interior, who had served as Iranian ambassador to Damascus. The Iranian government recalled him to Tehran and then entrusted him with the Ministry of the Interior to annoy the Syrians.

The Syrian Security Apparatus

The new Iranian ambassador, who had had relations with Syrian intelligence in the time of the shah, was personally chosen by President 'Ali Khamene'i to act as a bridge to establish direct contact with the Syrian security apparatus.

It is said in Tehran that the Iranian embassy in Damascus sent a number of reports to Khamene'i in recent months about the dissatisfaction of some Syrian intelligence officials with the Syrian-Jordanian rapprochement. These reports note that there are disputes between the intelligence agencies and the state apparatus regarding the dangers of the Syrian-Jordanian rapprochement and the possibility of Jordan undertaking to mediate between Baghdad and Damascus. The reason is that normalization of relations between Iraq and Syria, in the view of the Syrian security apparatus, will be in Iraq's interest and provide it with an opportunity to regain the bases that it lost in Lebanon and elsewhere in the region because of its war with Iran. Besides all these rumors about what is going on between Tehran and Damascus behind the scenes, observers ask: What are the five points to which Khamene'i referred in his meeting with the Iranian newsmen? What are the points on which Khamene'i asked his new ambassador to Damascus to demand that the Syrians state their position?

An important Iranian source visited Damascus last month in the company of Iranian Minister of Energy Dr Banki. He says the first point the new Iranian ambassador will discuss with the Syrians concerns Syrian-Jordanian relations.

Tehran's Questions for Syria

Although Hafiz al-Asad sent his foreign minister, Faruq al-Shar', to Tehran the day after he met with King Husayn to make it clear to the Iranian regime that the rapprochement between Syria and Jordan was effected at the expense of common positions (...) and will not affect the strategic alliance of Damascus with Tehran, a number of Iranian leaders headed by Hojjat ol-Eslam Khamene'i look upon this rapprochement with misgivings. Khamene'i asked Hojjat ol-Eslam Akhtari to request the Syrians to clarify the following matters:

1) Is King Husayn shuttling between Damascus, Baghdad, and Cairo because of any suggestions, hints, or encouragement from Damascus? And how far is Syria prepared to go with Husayn?

2) When Syria embarked upon negotiations to strengthen friendly relations with Jordan (as Faruq al-Shar' indicated in his meeting with Iranian officials) and at the same time tried to distance Jordan from Iraq, are these signs of a change in Jordan's policy toward Iraq?

3) Is Syria prepared to restore relations with Iraq if Jordanian mediation ends in guaranteeing Saudi oil and Kuwaiti dinars?

The second point that Khamene'i included in the note brought by Hojjat ol-Eslam Akhtari to Damascus, as the same Iranian source said, is the matter of Syria's debts to Iran, which together with interest amounted to $1.675 billion, of which $650 million dates back to 1976. It was a loan given by the shah to Syria. The balance is the value of the Iranian oil sent by Iran to Syria during the last 5 years (a million tons free and 4 million tons at $12.00 a barrel annually).

Because of Syria's failure to repay even a portion of the debt, the Iranian parliament voted last November in favor of a plan proposed by the minister of petroleum to link the resumption of oil shipments to Syria to the question of repayment of portions of the previous debts. The Iranian ambassador is expected to discuss the rescheduling of debt repayment with Syrian officials. However, according to the above-mentioned Iranian source, the debt card is the only pressure card that Khamene'i can play in the hope of forcing Damascus to accept the other points.

The third point is the future of Lebanon. Khamene'i wants Hizballah and the Islamic groups in Iran to play a direct role in determing it. Khamene'i has asked Damascus directly for official recognition of Hizballah.

The fourth point too dealt with Lebanon--and the need to remove Minister Nabih Birri from the leadership of Amal and to support the appointment of Hasan Hashim to this position. According to rumors in Beirut, Hasan Hashim remained secluded in his house in Beirut during the month of Ramadan because he was waiting for what Tehran promised him to happen, that is, the removal of Nabih Birri and at the same time Syrian recognition of him as the leader of Amal.

The fifth point in Khamene'i's paper, according to the Iranian source, is the future of Syrian-Iranian military cooperation and the extent to which Syria is prepared to provide Iran with such offensive weapons as planes and missiles.

The Iranian source thinks the honeymoon between Tehran and Damascus is about to end.

However, those familiar with the cat-and-mouse game being played by the Syrian president and the ayatollahs think that this time, too, the mouse will find, as it has found in the past, a way to get the ayatollah's pistachio nut and the cheese of others.

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MAJLIS APPROVES REFORM BILL ON RELATION OF LANDLORD-TENANT

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 2 Jun 86 p 19

[Text] KEYHAN's Political Service--Yesterday's open session of the Islamic Consultative Assembly was presided over by Hojjat ol-Eslam Hashemi Rafsanjani and it continued under the chairmanship of Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohammad Yazdi, deputy president of the Majlis.

At this session, the bill for amending the first subjoinder of the 9th article of the landlord-tenant law, the bill for affixing a new clause to the 3rd article of the law for the formation of the Supreme Council of Industries, the plan obligating the government to present an amendment for the development fund of pasture lands and its relevant articles of association and the main part of the bill pertaining to the Medical System Organization of the Islamic Republic of Iran were approved. Following is the detail of the report of yesterday's open session of the Majlis.

At this session, the first round of deliberation pertained to the bill for amending the first subjoinder which was approved on 19 September 1985 of the ninth article [which in turn was approved on 3 May 1983], regarding the relation of landlord-tenant was duly discussed and investigated.

Shushtari, reporter of the Judicial Affairs Commission explained this bill and said that it was referred to that main commission and was put up for discussion and exchange of opinions at the session held on 29 January 1986. As a result of the approval of the first subjoinder of this law which was ratified on 19 September 1985, the aforesaid subjoinder and the title of the amendment bill after approval was replaced by the new proposed subjoinder. In explaining the terms, he went on to add that as regards government buildings, the purpose of the amendment was to specifically distinguish the government and educational centers as such.

Thereafter, the single article of this bill was read and approved as follows:

Subjoinder I - In cases where the court recognizes the problem of sufficient or suitable space pertaining to the issuance of a decree for vacating a government or education building, it should desist from issuing such an order for a period of five years until all the difficulties and obstructions are properly resolved. This law is enforceable as of the date of its approval.

Bill Pertaining to the Addition of One Clause to the Third Article of the Law for the Formation of the Supreme Council of Industries

Subsequently, in the second round of deliberations the bill pertaining to the addition of one clause to the third article of the law for the formation of the Supreme Council of Industries, ratified on 29 January 1983 by the Islamic Consultative Assembly was duly investigated and discussed and certain explanations were given by the reporter of the Mines and Industries Commission. Thus, the single article of this bill was read and approved as follows:

Single Article--The following clause"number 7," hereby will be added to the third article of the law for the formation of the Supreme Council of Industries as ratified on 29 January 1983 by the Islamic Consultative Assembly.

7- Likewise, the minister of the Revolution Guards Corps is included in the third article of the aforementioned law:

1- Minister of industries

2- Minister of heavy industries

3- Minister of mines and metals

4- Minister of petroleum

5- Minister counsellor and director of the Plan and Budget Organization

6- Minister of national defense

7- Minister of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps of Iran.

The Plan Obligating the Government to Present an Amendment for the Development Fund of the Pasture Lands

Thereafter, the plan obligating the government to present an amendment for the development fund of the pasture lands and its relevant articles of association, which was ratified on 9 March 1961, was discussed and the reporter of the Rural Development and Agriculture Commission explained the subject. Thus, the single article was read and put to a vote and was approved as follows:

Single Article- Up to a maximum of six months after the approval of this law, the government is obligated to present the amendment for the development fund of the pasture lands to the Islamic Consultative Assembly for ratification.

Bill Pertaining to the Medical System Organization

Last item on yesterday's agenda was the first round of deliberations of the bill pertaining to the medical system organization of the Islamic Republic of Iran which was duly investigated and discussed.

Dr Sheybani, reporter of the Health Commission while giving some explanations about this bill stated: The bill pertaining to the Medical System Organization

was referred to the commission a long time ago and the commission carried out detailed investigations on it. And contrary to the statements of some of the officials of the Medical System who poisoned the minds of our doctors as to the non-referral of the said bill to the Medical System Organization, at that time I was the director of the Medical System Organization and we had been informed beforehand and in turn the medical system was to present any and all views regarding the medical system law. Some officials thought that the former laws of the era of the satan [the shah] was good enough and there was no need for an amendment and thus no proposal was given. Further, they say that they had been informed about the point in question at a time when the amendment for election was under discussion and that some of the responsible officials of the medical system took part in the commission, where they were asked to express their views.

Here the point at issue is that the said commission did not carry out a close scrutiny of the bill. The bill was a very detailed one and there were some people who in the meantime were publishing statements against the Islamic Republic causing some instigations and so forth. At any rate, what we wanted was to see that the first deliberation of the bill was investigated in the Majlis and if it was thus confirmed we thought that other details could have been worked out.

The main point is that arbitration of matters of a non-criminal code nature may pertain to the medical system; however, the medical system should not interfer with penal or judicial issues which fall under the jurisdiction of the Justice Department.

Notwithstanding, there ought to be a source of umpirage and arbitration when and where medical issues arise between certain organizations and physicians and in cases where such issues can not be resolved satisfactorily then the matter can be referred to the Justice Department.

Thereafter, Arsalan Safa'i Pour and Mehdi Rahbari Amlashi spoke for and Hassan Sadeq-lou and Movahedi Savoji spoke against this bill and the Health Commission reporter and the government representative in turn gave some explanation about the bill in question.

Subsequently, the main body of the bill of the Medical System Organization of the Islamic Republic of Iran was put to a vote and approved.

The open session of Majlis ended at 11:30 and the next session will be convened tomorrow, Tuesday at eight o'clock in the morning.

Our parliamentary correspondent also reports that at this session a question by Ahmad Azizi, representative from Qazvin, was put to the minister of economic affairs and finance regarding the 4-year delinquent credit loans extended to Tanzania.

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BILL APPROVED TO ASSIGN JUDGES TO SUPREME JUDICIAL COUNCIL

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 4 Jun 86 p 11

[Excerpts] Ratified Laws of the Majlis--Primarily, the reform bill on the agenda [which has been returned from the Council of Guardians] pertaining to the retraining of the official judicial experts was presented by the Judicial Affairs Commission of the Majlis in which Article XIII has been added as follows: Competence of a judicial expert must be undisputably clear to a judge. A judge can seek the counsel of a competent judicial expert, even though he is not an official employee of the government.

After pertinent explanations by Mr Shushtari, reporter of the said commission, the aforementioned amendment [reform bill] was put to a vote and was approved.

Another item on the agenda of this specific session pertained to the designation of the execution period of experimentation with the bill amending the law concerning the councils responsible for investigating administrative infringements which was approved by the deputies for a trial period of two years.

Bill Authorizing Employment of Judges

The next subject on the agenda was the bill on authorization of assigning judges to the Supreme Judicial Council which was put up for discussion and investigation by the Judicial and Legal Affairs Commission of the Majlis.

Mr Shushtari, reporter of the abovementioned commission, while explaining the processes for the new employment authorization of the judges, considered the necessary budget for this bill as already secured.

Mr Favad Karimi was the first representative who spoke against this bill and the processes for securing its budget, and stated: The main thing is that we ought to clear the source for securing this budget and not pay attention to the procedural budgetary measures. Under the present circumstances when we are facing certain limitations for securing our budgetary allocations, we must first give priority to the war issues and second provide for the basic necessities, education and training, and health and treatment issues. At this juncture, glorification or aggrandizement of the judicial system is not advisable and despite the increased number of personnel as compared to the period before the advent of the revolution, this system has not been able to meet the criteria for ideal Islamic justice. If we really want to correct our judicial system, we ought to merge our revolution courts with the justice system and enhance the quality of our judicial organization as a whole.

Mr Dehqan spoke for the bill in question and while pointing to the source of budgetary allocation, he said: The first and second articles of the budget of the Justice Department also applies to the point in question and if there is going to be any employment authorization the proper or most advisable course of action must be observed accordingly.

Another thing, if we are going to observe our priorities, I should say each and every one of our problems could be given the preference of a priority--and for that matter, we don't have a device for gauging our priorities either. In Islam the matter of judgement and judiciousness has been emphasized and one way of enhancing the quality of our judicial system is to expose the novice judges to the main current of events and I think this is a positive step for the Justice Department.

Mr Ha'eri-zadeh was the second person who spoke against the bill and the statements which were made by Mr Yazdi, president of the Judicial Commission. Ha'eri-zadeh said that the bill in question pertains to the issue of employment of judges and as such the authorization for employment of judges, like that of each and every other organization should have been referred to the Labor and Employment Commission of the Majlis so as to bring it on equal footing with the rest of our employment issues. Furthermore, according to the constitution, the Supreme Judicial Council is obligated to present judicial bills suitable to the needs of the Islamic Republic system and reactivate our judicial method, otherwise employment of extra personnel and increase of salaries of the judges won't solve our problems.

Mr Shamlu spoke for the bill and said: The issue of providing proper security and enhancing the general public's morale so far as our judicial system is concerned is of particular significance. It would indicate that we pay a great deal of attention to our judicial issues and with due consideration to the importance of security in our Islamic society the judicial cadre must accordingly be strengthened.

Mr Isma'il Fada'i spoke against the bill and said: First we must see how successful our judicial system has been in eradicating corruption and providing security and it is the opinion of all the pious and clear-sighted individuals who believe that the issue of education ought to be given more attention and thereafter other issues could be tackled as the need arises. However, before attending the issue of education in a more attentive manner, expanding of our judicial system or increasing the number of our judges is something unnecessary, particularly at a time, when after the advent of the revolution the 900 million toman budget of the Justice Department has reached 2.9 billion tomans, and this is an exorbitant sum of money which is spent on the judicial system.

Mr Musavi Tabrizi spoke for the bill and stated: On the one hand, you expect our judicial system to be an ideal organization, on the other you won't allow the employment of new judges. This is a case of duplicity or inconsistent duality. Of course, I too have certain reservations about the judicial system, however,

in order for this system to be able to carry our its functions most desirably and resolve the issues at hand, it needs more judges to do its work.

Mr Rahimi spoke against the bill and said: If we were to give our judges true independence and if they were to make independent judgement without being influenced by the telephone recommendations or statements of other eminent judges, then we could say that they can truly do service to the Justice Department as such.

Here, one of the main problems of the justice organization is that our experienced judges who are skilled in judicial affairs are not willing to work for the judicial system at all, the reason being that they are going to lose their independence. Therefore, authorization for the employment of new judges cannot resolve the problem of the justice organization.

Mr Soltani spoke for the bill and stated: We need more than one thousand judges and there are certain districts which have no judge at all, particularly some remote areas of the country where many unresolved files have been piling up and if we do not properly resolve these outstanding cases then we will have to face more displeasure and wrath of the people for the Justice Department. We believe that our judicial system can be amended and it can serve the people in a more satisfactory manner.

Thereafter, Mr Habibi, minister of justice, while defending the aforementioned bill stated: The issues of the Justice Department have no connection with the authorization for the employment of judges, on the other hand we are not imposing any new expenditure on the state budget. For instance, in the current year 250 million tomans were deducted from the Justice Department's budget of 22.5 billion rials by the relevant commission. Later they added 70 million tomans and after our petition and entreaty they added the remaining 180 million tomans to our budget.

The issue of relocating and replenishing judges is very significant and profoundly so, and whenever I hear that a certain judge has been removed from a certain district it just creates a lot of anxiety and discomfort in me and I know that with the prevailing problems of our judicial system yet another difficulty has been added to the existing pile. And as we know every day the issue of insufficient number of judges is reiterated in the Majlis.

Once more Mr Shushtari gave some explanations in this regard and thereafter the bill was puto to a vote and was approved. The last subject on yesterday's agenda of the Majlis pertained to the amendment of the second article of the law pertaining to the formation of the Ministry of Health, Treatment and Medical Training and the addition of one article with two subjoinders to the said law which was rejected by the Health and Welfare Commission.

It is reflected in the second article of the law for the formation of the Ministry of Health, Treatment and Medical Training as approved by the Islamic Consultative

Assembly on November 28, 1985:

Article II- With the approval of this law and formation of the Ministry of Health, Treatment and Medical Training, the Ministry of Welfare and Hygiene will be dissolved and all the obligations, authorities, possibilities, and personnel of the Ministry of Welfare and Hygiene and its affiliated organizations and that part of the duties, authorities, possibilities, personnel, credit allocations of the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education as regards health, treatment, training and medical research will be transferred to this ministry accordingly.

Subjoinder--All the duties and authorities of the minister of welfare and culture and higher education which are related to the health, treatment, training and medical research will be duly transferred to the minister of this ministry.

A- The second law for the formation of the Ministry of Health, Treatment and Medical Training together with its subjoinder will be amended as follows:

Article II and its amendatory subjoinder--With the ratification of this law and the formation of the Ministry of Health, Treatment and Medical Training, the Ministry of Welfare and Hygiene will be dissolved and all the duties, authorities, possibilities, personnel, finances, allocations and other responsibilities of the Ministry of Welfare and Hygiene and its affiliated organizations and companies will be duly transferred to the Ministry of Health, Treatment and Medical Training.

Subjoinder--All the duties and authorities of the minister of welfare and hygiene will be transferred to the minister of health, treatment and medical training.

B- One article with two subjoinders will be added to the law for the formation of the Ministry of Health, Treatment and Medical Training as follows:

Adjunct Article--For the purpose of training teachers and research personnel needed by the country and in order to allow the growth and self-sufficiency of medical colleges of large [mother] universities in sciences, such universities will be exempt from the restrictions of the law pertaining to the formation of the Ministry of Health, Treatment and Medical Training. As before, all large [mother] universities with all their obligations, authorities, possibilities, personnel, finances, credit allocations and responsibilities will be under the supervision of the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education.

Subjoinder I- Here large [mother] university in this law applies to all those universities which were formed before the advent of the revolution.

Subjoinder II- That part of the law which is in contradiction to this law will be null and void.

At first, Mr Sheybani, reporter of the Health Commission explained his views for rejecting the bill, thereafter Messieurs Me'mari and Sadeqlu spoke for and against the bill and then the session was recessed until the next day.

Yesterday's open session was adjourned at noon. The Islamic Consultative Assembly will have an open session today.

12719
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VARIOUS MARITIME SERVICES TO PROMOTE NON-PETROLEUM EXPORTS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 3 Jun 86 p 18

[Text] In order to stimulate non-petroleum exports of the country, the Islamic Republic Shipping Company of Iran through establishing regular maritime services to European, Latin American and Far Eastern countries, will be ready to export various exportable goods of the economic sector of the country. Likewise, for the purpose of enhancing export procedures throughout the Persian Gulf regions, certain appropriate measures have been taken so as to make it possible for Iranian exporters to send abroad their goods, particularly varieties of fruits.

The above statement as made by the deputy commercial director of the Islamic Republic Shipping Company at a press, radio and TV interview. Furthermore, Mr Mahmud Farhang Tarjoman pointed to the new shipping lines which will be established from the ports of origin of Bushehr and Bandar-e Abbas to other Persian Gulf destinations and 50-80 million dollars of foreign exchange will be saved for refueling of the ships of the said company at Iranian ports.

According to the economic correspondent of KEYHAN, he went on to add: The Shipping Company of the Islamic Republic of Iran which possesses the largest number of merchant mrines in the Middle East, in view of the people-serving government's policy in order to enhance the level of non-petroleum exports and fight the new plot concerning the oil price reduction, has established maritime services to European, Latin America and the Far East destinations of which public announcements have appeared in the mass circulation newspapers. This maritime service, in addition to shipping import commodities also accepts export consignments from all the economic sectors of the country for the ports of call or embarkation.

Further, he said: For this reason we have considered allowing a discount of more than 20 percent in our tariff rates and in cases where an exporter could charter an entire ship or more he will get preferential rates.

Tarjoman also stated: If or when our exporters are considering forwarding their goods through shipping lines, they can contact the Shipping Company of the Islamic Republic of Iran in advance so that proper arrangements can be made for the export of their consignments by 10- up to 40-thousand-ton merchant marines.

As regards the export of goods to various Persian Gulf states, he said: The Shipping Company of the Islamic Republic of Iran has begun certain measures to facilitate export of goods to the various Persian Gulf states and at the

present time, it intends to expand such activities. Suitable merchant marines for this region of the Gulf are making regular trips between the port of Bandar-e Abbas and that of Sharjah [U.A.E.]. Likewise, since this company possesses smaller tonnage merchant marines, it can, on a charter basis, help the Iranian exporters from the beginning of the fruit season.

More recently, the first consignment of bagasse [sugar-cane molasses] was shipped to Great Britain for one of the Iranian exporters and at this moment the ship, "Iran Beheshti" [which carried the aforesaid cargo] is unloading its freight. It is estimated that during the next two years about 400,000 tons of similar consignments will be delivered to the Shipping Company of the Islamic Republic of Iran for export. He went on to add: Certainly, with an increase in the volume of export goods we will consider a decrease in shipment rates in order to reduce the pressure of foreign exchange on the state budget and at the same time make our maritime services competitive with the international shipping companies.

Regarding the creation of maritime bilateral services between the ports of Bandar-e Abbas and that of Sharjah, he said: At first, the services of this shipping line were unknown; however, with the passage of time and with the presentation of better and more professional services, we have been able to attract the attention of more passengers so that during the vacation season we transport about 300 passengers and 400 tons of cargo on a weekly basis. The Shipping Company of the Islamic Republic of Iran intends to increase the number of voyages of this shipping line if the volume of export demands such an increase. For this purpose we could use those merchant ships which ply between our own ports. Here it should be noted that such merchant marines are also capable of loading and unloading trucks or transporting them if necessary.

He further stated: With the delivery of three new ships from South Korea the number of our commercial fleet reaches 85 and of this total 45 vessels are tramps, 21 others are general freight carries and the remainder are passenger, fuel suppliers or tug-vessels. Moreover, this company is one of the most active leasers of merchant ships in the world.

As regards the establishment of new passenger shipping lines between the various Iranian ports of the Persian Gulf, the deputy commercial director of the Shipping Company stated: In the very near future regular maritime services between the ports of origin of Bandar-e Abbas and Bushehr to other destination islands such as Kish, Kharg, Lavan, Abu-Musa and the port of Lengeh [Bandar-e Lengeh] will start their activities. Primarily, an experimental voyage to the Kish Island and Bandar-e Lengeh will be completed and thereafter the travel schedules of the various ships will be duly announced to the public.

Regarding transporting the Iranian Hajj pilgrims, Tarjoman stated: For the purpose of sending Hajj pilgrims to Saudi Arabia by ship through the Persian Gulf, several pertinent meetings have been held with the responsible officials of the relevant organs and associations which have not yet resulted in any concrete steps. On the other hand, because the transport of the Hajj pilgrims to Saudi

Arabia has to be carried out only through the port of Jeddah--which tends to make such a trip quite a very long one by sea--and on account of the expense involved and a lack of familiarity by our countrymen to the lore and culture of sea voyage, the reality of such a measure seems far-fetched.

He went on to add: In order to introduce more professional maritime services we are also studying the possibility of leasing the merchant marines of this company for covering other courses of travel. This is an action which will bring about more savings in foreign exchange and after proper investigation of the relevant legal issues and other operational procedures, the Shipping Company of the Islamic Republic will put such a project into operation. Furthermore, other steps have been taken by this shipping company to save foreign exchange; such measures include the reduction of maritime personnel foreign exchange salaries, securing or meeting some of the basic needs of the various ships at the Iranian ports, and securing the necessary fuel of these ships with the cooperation of the oil tankers of the Petroleum Ministry--only such measures alone can save us between 50-80 million dollars of foreign exchange annually.

He also said: For the purpose of expanding the commercial fleet and refurbishing its used vessels' parts, there are certain measures which are being studied so as to make it possible by proper repair and some technical changes, to enter the era of fuel efficiency technology.

As regards the rates of the Shipping Company of the Islamic Republic, he said: In addition to a discount of more than 20 percent in the rate of transport of goods by the regular maritime service lines, we accept 60 percent of the total charge in foreign exchange and 40 percent in rials--which in reality makes about 60 percent discount in the total of our rates.

He further added: With due consideration to the fact that our country is very rich in minerals, we ought to expand our activities in the area of mineral exports ever more, since despite our increased ability in the field of export we do not have sufficient scientific and practical investment for that purpose. He concluded that there should be further work in this regard and proposed that there should be a center for export information so as to make it possible for our exporters to obtain the necessary information of what and where to export their products. For instance, many of our exporters are not aware of the fact that the Shipping Company of the Islamic Republic will determine the shipping charges according to the agreement of the exporters and not based on a flat tariff rates. Furthermore, as the volume of export cargo increases the rates decrease and there will be even more competitive rates as such. Moreover, in addition to the 85 merchant marines available to the company, there are other chartered or leased vessels available to our shipping company which make it possible for our exporters to have the maximum capacity of service.

At the end of this interview, Tarjoman pointed to the statistics and figures and said: The nominal capacity of our ships exceed two million tons, thus it is

possible to export nearly seven million tons of goods by our own commercial fleet. In the month of Farvardin [21 March - 20 April] of the current year about 200,000 tons of goods including concentrated lead, coke, chromite ores, cast iron and copper bars have been reserved with us for shipment.

During the same month we transported 40,000 tons of cargo and with due consideration to our new activities we expect that this trend will keep increasing. Also, during the month of Ordibehesht [21 April - 21 May] such goods or cargoes as dried fruits, laundry detergents, copper bars, building stones and other types of consignments have been proposed for shipment.

It should be pointed out here that these figures do not include the export of those commodities which are transported by truck or our railroad system. The The shipping company, however is looking for volume in transporting of the cargoes so as to be able to reduce the expenditure as far as possible.

He went on to add: We hope that the government sector, which has control over the lion share of the exportable goods, will pay more attention to the export issue so that the existing bureaucracy does not cause more delay or holdup our exports.

Furthermore, at the end of this interview the public relations office of the Shipping Company of the Islamic Republic of Iran announced that the complete travel schedule of this shipping company together with the name of the ports of origin and destination ports will be continually issued in the "Payam-e Darya," a publication of the Shipping Company of the Islamic Republic of Iran, for the interested parties.

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BILL ON ORGANIZATION OF COUNTRY'S MEDICAL SYSTEM APPROVED

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 2 Jun 86 p 12

[Excerpts] Ratified Laws of the Majlis--On the agenda of today's session the investigation of the bill pertaining to the law for recording of documents and real estate, its amendment and deletion, as was ratified by the Majlis and other amendments of the said bill together with the addition of one subjoinder, article 144 of the law for registering of property, annulling of the article 6 of the law for establishing the Supreme Council of Urban Renewal as ratified on March 13, 1972 and part of article 101 of the law for municipalities and some other articles were put to discussion and were approved as follows:

Article 148- As regards those landed properties which are owned by the municipalities or government, if by the time of ratification of this law the occupiers of these landed properties have constructed a dwelling on such properties, after due investigation the government of the municipalities in question are obligated to sell the landed property together with the amenities at the going price according to the subjoinder 46 of the budget law of 1364 [21 March 1985 - 20 March 1986] of the pertinent zone to the occupier, if the occupier/builder of the dwelling does not own any other residence. In case the builder of the dwelling in question owns another house, the government and the municipalities can sell the landed property with the supervision of official real estate expert of the Justice Department, together with all the amenities at the going price to the said home owner. The offices of property record are required to register the sale of such property transactions according to the regulations.

Subjoinder I- The mandate or restrictions of this article will not include those cases where the retention of the property according to the pertinent laws would be necessary for the government or one of its arms such as any one of the ministries, municipalities or other companies and organizations affiliated with the government. In special cases where the government or municipalities agree in offering landed property for sale then the matter could accordingly be approved by the council of ministers.

Subjoinder II- As of the date of ratification of this law the government is obligated to prevent the possession or occupation of any landed property belonging to the government or municipalities and demolish any and all structures which are built on such properties.

Article III- In each case where it is necessary to subdivide or partition a landed property for the above-stated purposes, the record offices will do so

according to the prevailing situation and they will be exempt from the restrictions of article 154.

At the time of the issuance of the title deed for any of the applicants who will be using the regulations of this law, in addition to the cost of the ownership booklet, they will be required to pay an equivalent of 15-thousands of the value of the property in question, and where the value of a certain property has not been determined, an assessment note will be used as the basis for such payments. All such receipts will be deposited in the pertinent government account.

In certain cases where the property in question lacks the primary title deed, in addition to the above-stated charges, a registry or record fee will be received according to the regulations.

Article IV- The courts of law and all the real estate and documents' record offices are required to take proper measures according to the pertinent subdivision maps which have been confirmed by the local municipal offices and accordingly go about partitioning all the landed properties which are located within the boundaries of the cities. Furthermore, the municipalities are obligated, based on the comprehensive regulations and other relevant working rules of urban planning, to take appropriate steps within two months, as regards the aforementioned subdivision maps which have been forwarded to them by the courts or the real estate record offices, and express their views together with subdivision map in question, otherwise the courts of law and the real estate and documents' record offices can independently take the necessary steps to carry out the partitioning procedure.

Article V- The following subjoinder as subjoinder three will be added to Article 144 of the Record Law.

Subjoinder III- Delineation of the property lines of the transferred shares to the farmers or special landowner share or other pertinent legal proceedings will be carried out after proper identification by the local agricultural office for each plot of land, whether or not the property in question has a title deed or is in the process of getting one.

Bill of Medical System Organization of the Islamic Republic of Iran

The final subject on yesterday's Majlis agenda pertained to the first round of deliberation of the bill of medical system organization which was approved after several statements which were made by the proponents and the opponents. The main body of this bill states:

Bill of Medical System Organization of the Islamic Republic of Iran

First Chapter - Description and Objectives:

Article I- The Medical System Organization of the Islamic Republic of Iran which will be called "organization" in this law, is an independent organization with

all the legal rights which has been formed in order to realize the objectives of this law.

Article II- the objectives of the orgganization consist of the following:

1- Realization of the lofty Islamic values in all medical affairs.

2- Protection of the medical ethics and dignity commensurate with the holy precepts of Islam.

3- Improvement of the medical-related affairs.

4- Enhancement of the level of medical knowledge.

5- Protection of the patients' rights versus the medical personnel and vice versa.

6- Arrangement of professional interactions between various medical practitioners with due regard to protecting the patients' rights, that of health, treatment, private/governmental, charity or other Islamic revolution organs.

7- Support and protection of the rights of all medical pretitioners.

8- Resolution of the differences between various medical professions and investigation of the disciplinary violations of medical practitioners according to the law.

Article III and its relevant subjoinder together with the addition of following sections: I, G, K, L [description missing], M and N.

Section I an adjunct of Article III- Provision of financial assistance to the low-income institutions and other medical practitioners who have incurred a loss one way or another, through loans without interest or gratis loans from the organization's cooperative fund, according to the regulation which will be prepared by the Supreme Medical Council.

Section G an adjunct of Article III- Cooperation with other relevant sources for the purpose of putting the medical and treatment services tariff into execution.

Section K an adjunct of Article III- Cooperation with other pertinent sources for the purpose of collecting taxes and other dues from the medical institutions and other practitioners.

Section M an adjunct of Article III- Inclusion of other duties which have been assigned to the Medical System Organization by the Islamic Consultative Assembly.

Section N an adjunct of Article III- Establishment of an account for the collection or payment of medical claims/indemnification through the Welfare and Cooperative Fund.

Eligible individuals or institutions which fall under the restrictions of this law will be accountable to the relevant ministries, their executive regulations and other articles of association of the pertinent welfare fund of the country.

Fourth Chapter

Article V- Make-up of the organization is as follows:

A- The Central Council of the Medical System Organization of the Islamic Republic of Iran which is referred to in this law as the "Central Council."

B- The Provincial Center Medical System.

C- The Township Medical System.

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MAJLIS GIVES CONTROL OF BARREN LANDS TO GOVERNMENT

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 12 June 86 p 2

[Text] KEYHAN Political Service—The bill for assigning barren lands and voiding their documents was approved by deputies at today's public Majlis session.

Under this bill all documents pertaining to non-government lands outside the cities, excepting lands which have been transferred by competent authorities, are void, and lands of this type are given to the government.

The deputies from Urmia and Natanz discussed the country's political and economic issues in speeches preceding the day's agenda.

A report on today's public Majlis session and the full text of the bill assigning barren lands and voiding their documents follows below.

'Ali 'Abd ol-'Alizadeh, the deputy from Urmia, was the first speaker prior to the day's Majlis agenda. He mentioned the Imam's speech on the day of the Feast of the Sacrifice. He said: The Imam's call guided us to bear the weapon of unity. Unity is the weapon that has brought us to victory, and it made us victorious over the oppressive monarchy. It was with this same weapon of unity that we achieved victory on the fronts of the fight with the counterrevolution and Iraq's imposed war against Iran.

He added: Now that world imperialism has summoned all its mercenaries and attacked our economic foundations by lowering the price of oil, it is definitely and certainly the presence of the nation of partisans of God on the scene, the help of the people in turning the country's economic, social, and military wheels, and reliance on the very great blessings of the divine gifts to this country that can make us successful in reaching economic self-sufficiency and cutting our dependency on oil.

The Urmia deputy then said: With careful planning and utilization of the potential talents of the various classes of people, within the next three or four years we can see economic independence for the country, and we can provide some of the needs of other Islamic nations.

'Abd ol-'Alizadeh, discussing the problems of his constituency, said: In recent years, some officials, with the mistaken idea of sowing discord and disrupting the government, have created scandalous disagreements and splits between the people and officials, and especially the clergy, of

Urmia. For several days now, as the result of the instruction of the ever-vigilant clergy and of measured steps taken by the Council of Ministers, the wind of unity and harmony has been blowing in this area.

He added: After the striking welcome from the people of Urmia for Hojjat ol-Eslam Hasani, the respected Friday Imam of Urmia, on his return from a relatively long journey he had taken for health care, the first fruits of the unity between the province's clergy, people, and officials were an International Jerusalem Day demonstration and a splendid prayer service for the Feast of the Sacrifice which were grander than those of the early days of the triumph of the Islamic revolution.

The Urmia deputy noted that in three months the Urmia grape and apple crops will be ready to harvest. He called upon the government, the merchants, and the Urmia orchard growers to take comprehensive measures under these national circumstances to export surplus apples and grapes, in order to bring in a significant amount of foreign exchange as well as to support orchard growers and farmers.

'Abd ol-'Alizadeh said that agricultural and animal husbandry investment in West Azarbaijan is profitable and shows a rapid return. He said: The various banks of the province are ready to invest without using foreign exchange in the various areas of agriculture, animal husbandry, fish farming, and other productive and employment-creating occupations. It is necessary to strengthen and give greater heed and support to the Minister of the Economic Affairs and Finance, the Chief of the Central Bank, and the country's other banks.

At the end of his speech he gave thanks and praise to the combatants of the army and the revolutionary guards who were able, with solidarity and unified operations, to teach a good lesson to the Zionist Ba'thist mercenaries and to fill the valleys of Hajj 'Omran with the corpses of Saddam's men, and to the officials of the organizations, the executive units of West Azarbaijan, and the nation of partisans of God.

Speech by the Natanz Deputy

The other speaker prior to the Majlis agenda was Seyyed Ahmad Kashani, the Natanz deputy. He said: Now, after more than five years of resistance by the nation's brave children, the war has entered its fateful phase, and comprehensive military, political, and economic preparations are of the utmost necessity in order move towards the very basic goal of the Islamic revolution, which is to uproot Zionism in the area.

He referred to the Imam's talk on the necessity for going to the fronts and his repetition of Iran's conditions for ending the war at the beginning of the current year. He said: The sensitivity and importance of this juncture is also completely clear to the foreign powers, and we can clearly perceive the practical and propaganda measures of the enemy and his agents in recent months, and his extensive efforts to impose peace and hold our nation back from the sacred path it has taken. These include the oil war, the attack on the oil, industrial, and communications centers, the weakening of the army, Iraq's change from defensive to offensive tactics, and other instances which have taken place collectively to make our nation surrender.

Continuing, Kashani said: The question that arises for the nation is how has the enemy been able to attack great economic investments such as our refineries and other installations, after five years of war and with the recognition that exists of the enemy's Zionist essence? It is worth mentioning that around 120 billion dollars of the country's foreign exchange income have been spent since the revolution.

Our nation has given unsparingly of life and property and will continue to do so, but it was not within the power of the people to attend to these defense matters. Wouldn't it be better if the government attended to its own sensitive responsibilities and duties instead of interfering with the daily affairs of the people such as the buying and selling of rice and oil and other general staple items which our honest nation can handle in a better and less costly manner? Who is responsible and answerable for these harrowing events? It expected that the people should be given an explanation. He said to the enemies of Islam and their domestic agents: The Iranian nation has knowingly burned all the bridges behind it and has decided to fight to the final victory at any cost. Continuing he gave criticism and warning concerning the weakening of the army. He said: As Iraq changed tactics and adopted an offensive position, it found the army all along the fronts to be a great obstacle to its aggression. It is has employed domestic agents and made use of the unawareness of some to carry out extensive propaganda in order on the one hand to remove an obstacle from its path, and on the other hand, if this deception should succeed, to convince our nation that we have no army. Naturally this would open the way for imposing peace. However our loyal army, along with other combatants of the revolutionary guard and the mobilization, whose unity God has preserved and is increasing daily, thwarted their new offensive role with a heroic defense and made them pay a heavy price.

The Natanz deputy then mentioned the plot to lower the price of oil. He said: In my view, the whole blame for this matter cannot be laid on the countries of the area. As the officials have said repeatedly, it was the Islamic revolution alone which caused the increase in the price of oil. If such be the case, therefore, a more comprehensive approach and analysis must be presented for the fall of oil prices. What is clear and definite, however, is that the international plunderers, along with their goal of sucking our nation's blood, have tried to weaken our economic foundation and our combat capability in order to keep us from reaching the goal we have set for ourselves and to draw us into an imposed peace.

At the conclusion of his talk, Kashani said: The one and only way to strengthen the country's economic foundation is to implement the wise advice of the dear leader of the revolution who said that the people must participate in all affairs.

Majlis Agenda

After the pre-agenda speeches and the reading of comments from deputies to the country's executive officials, the Majlis took up its agenda and continued its work on the bill to assign barren lands and void their documents, which was left unfinished from the previous session, and proposals were presented concerning notations for this bill.

The Agricultural Commission proposed two notes for the bill. Seyyed Javad Angoli, Chief of the Agricultural Commission, gave explanations. He said: In addition to these two notes, the Agricultural Commission has approved proposals in the first consultation concerning notes seven and 65 as well as notes three, four, and five in the second consultation.

Speaking in opposition to the proposal, Movahhadi Savoji said: The Agricultural Commission, instead of naming the seven-person councils for land assignment, has proposed an authority composed of two experts to be named by the Central Barren Lands Assignment Office, while the seven-person councils, both from the standpoint of expertise and of their composition and membership, are much more precise and appropriate than what these brothers have proposed.

Qanbar Kabiri spoke in support of the proposal. He said: What the Agricultural Commission has approved for notes one and two for an authority to assign barren lands has been clearly stipulated. Agricultural experts will be given this task, and the manner of assignment will be stipulated in executive guidelines. I therefore support the proposal from the Agricultural Commission for this note.

Then Shushtari, an expert on the Judicial and Legal Commission, gave explanations concerning this proposal. He said: If the notes proposed by the Agricultural Commission are combined with those proposed by the Judicial Commission, we have nothing to say and we are in agreement with it. We named the seven-person councils as the authority for assigning barren lands. They have representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture, two reliable persons and a religious magistrate, and they can better assign barren lands.

After that the government's representative gave explanations. He said: If these notes are combined it will be more practical. In my view the proposal from the Judicial Commission is more practical from an executive point of view, since it is prepared so that the Ministry of Agriculture will be charged with assigning the barren lands through the seven-person councils.

The Housing and Urban Development Commission then presented a proposal to revise note six from this bill. Mohammad Reza Bahonar, an expert from this commission, presented explanations. He said: We are concerned about who will be the trustee for these lands whose documentation is to be voided. Outside the cities there are lands whose documentation will be voided. Priority can be assigned by the seven-person councils, and until they assign the lands, these lands outside the cities will be used for agriculture.

Eshaq Jahangiri and Gholam'ali Shahraki spoke in opposition and in favor respectively for this proposal, and the Judicial Commission expert and the government expert gave explanations in this area. After that, Mohammad Yazdi proposed an amendment in the form of a supplemental note, and after comments for and against it was put to a vote and rejected.

Then Article One and the notes to this bill were put to a vote and enacted as follows:

Article One—All non-government documents and papers, both official and unofficial, pertaining to barren lands (or documents pertaining to parts of barren lands) located outside the precincts of the municipalities, except lands which have been assigned by competent authorities, are void, and such lands are given to the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran in order that they may be used for agricultural and industrial production, the creation of employment and public interest uses, meeting the needs of governmental units, Islamic revolutionary organizations, the municipalities, creating housing, and land assignments to persons without housing on a case-by-case basis and based on the pertinent regulations. It is the responsibility of the Document Registration Office to issue deeds for lands in the name of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran as the cancellation of the lands' documentation is announced by the land assignment councils.

Note 1—Barren lands outside the cities will be identified by the Ministry of Agriculture through the seven-person councils.

Note 2—Those trespassing on barren lands who have done so without authorization and legal sanction, or without an assignment from the Land Revitalization Act of 1/26/59 [15 April 1980], if they are determined to be unqualified by the seven-person councils, will be evicted and their documentation voided.

Note 3—Deeds for barren lands which are voided under this law will be considered free. Claims arising from the sale of these lands are voided, and other creditor claims on other property of the debtor may be forgiven.

Note 4—Lands whose documentation is voided, if located within villages, will be allocated for public interest works, pasture, village housing construction, and other necessary rural uses on a case-by-case basis.

Note 5—The executive guidelines for this law will be prepared and submitted to the Council of Ministers for approval within two months by the Ministry of Agriculture and the Central Land Assignment Councils Staff.

Note 6—From the date of Article One's enactment all conflicting laws and regulations are void.

Note 7—Lands determined by the land assignment councils not to be needed for agriculture will be turned over to the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development for urban expansion, industrial, and service projects. Authorization for land revitalization for non-agricultural uses will be issued by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development.

The public session recessed at 10:35.

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IRAN

TEHRAN RADIO COMMENTARY ON 'GOALS OF ZIONISM'

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[Commentary by the Central News Unit Research Group: "Analysis of the Goals of Zionism and Deepening Anti-Zionist Struggles"]

[Text] The first congress to analyze Zionism was a worthy step taken this year during Jerusalem week, in accordance with the holy task of attacks by divulging facts against world aggression and its obvious offspring, Zionism.

The first session of the congress analyzing Zionism was opened last Tuesday in the College of Law at Tehran University. In addition to political and religious Muslim personalities from Iran and Palestine, the religious leader of the Jewish community in Iran, members of the Jewish intellectual society, and other members of religious minorities took part in the opening ceremonies and later discussions.

This public welcome for such a congress is a result of increasing awareness with regard to the Zionist enemy, regardless of religion, and the role of Zionists in strengthening the world aggression.

Zionism at the beginning of its formation and before it was shaped was used by Jersih capitalists in Europe to keep and strengthen the power of their capital at the expense of normal and ordinary people of the Jewish faith. Now, in addition to having a criminal existence in the Middle East and the occupied territories of Palestine and the holy Jerusalem, it has shown its face throughout the world. The results of the horrid policies of Zionism and imperialism in creating misfortune and poverty in Africa and Latin America and in many other parts of the world are quite clear to all.

This colonialist role is more pronounced with regard to Jews living in Muslim countries because of their good brotherly relations with the Muslims and to Jews living in eastern countries, especially in Asia and the Middle East, because of the awareness of the Muslims which prevented the growth of anti-Semitism directed by the Zionists in order to cause rifts between the different religions.

An example of Zionist policies with regard to Oriental Jews is the bombing of a synagogue in Baghdad in 1948. According to the confessions of Ben Gurion, then prime minsiter of the occupying regime of Palestine, he himself had a hand in this affair to promote an atmosphere of anti-Semitism and to encourage the Iraqi Jews to immigrate.

Also, in some cases and according to existing documents, Oriental Jews were bought like slaves from the puppet rulers in some countries. All these facts point to defined policies to safeguard Zionist investment at the expense of sacrificing all the human values, and approving various forms of threats, pressures, and insome cases killings.

The real victims of this policy at present are the poor Muslims whose holy homeland has been chosen as the headquarters and center for carrying out this disgraceful policy of colonialism and has been occupied by its founders. By turning holy territory into a center of crime, the regime occupying Jerusalem has now become a weapon which hits at any place that has become or is about to become a birthplace for struggle against world oppression.

The forerunners in this case are the American Zionists who form the biggest colonialist power which uses the experiences gained in the formation of the occupying regime of Jersulaem in various shapes throughout the world. They spread the rumor concerning Zionism's extraordinary strength, thereby trying to put a cover on their own weaknesses.

But if U.S. defeats in the last decades are an indication of how untruthful this propaganda is, the formation of seminars to examine and recognize Zionism in a scientific manner should be considered as the beginning of more revelations which prove the shallowness of Zionism.

In any case, recognizing the enemy is a basic requirement in confronting it. In this path the Islamic Republic of Iran, led by the imam of Ummah, is recognized as the forerunner in the struggle against Zionism inside Palestine and throughout the world. By organizing the congress to analyze Zionism, Iran has taken a worthwhile step. The necessity of strengthening this step in the future is clear to all. It is hoped that the presence of delegates from other countries and ethnic minorities entangled with Zionism, in future sessions of this congress, would strengthen it. By safeguarding the scientific aspects of such a congress in various levels, it would lay the groundwork for world awareness as the foundation for the formation of a unified front against Zionism-imperialism throughout the world.

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ARTICLE DETAILS REGIME'S STRENGTH, WEAKNESSES

Paris LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE in French Jun 86 pp 1, 14-15

[Article by Ahmad Faroughy: "Strength and Weaknesses of the Iranian Regime"]

> [Text] In addition to the human and financial cost of the war with Iraq, Iran must also face the effect of the drop in the price of oil on its economy. The Shiite government nevertheless seems to have the situation well in hand, constantly struggling to consolidate the foundations of the Islamic revolution. Against the regime of Iraqi President Saddam Husayn, it makes the most of the political and diplomatic assets that might aid it in its fight (see pp 14 and 15). At home, it has taken the precaution of reducing the number of power centers to ensure that it is safe from any destabilization attempt. There remains the dissension within the leadership itself, dissension that casts a shadow of uncertainty over the fate of the revolution after the disappearance of Imam Khomeyni.

While the Islamic Republic enters its eighth year and the health of its founder, Imam Khomeyni, 86, remains precarious, the future of the regime depends to a great extent on one question: In its current form, has the Islamic revolution betrayed the Iranian revolution of which it aims to be the sole heir?

Beginning with the very fall of the Shah in February 1979, the monopolization of power by the Shiite clergy is now complete. Thanks to the physical elimination of its former allies in the opposition -- the nationalists (National Front), the Marxist far left (Fadayan-e Khalq), the Islamic far left (Modjahedine-e Khalq) and the pro-Soviet communists (Tudeh Party) -- no domain can now escape the control of the clerical apparatus, beginning with the structure of government.

The latter -- and this is one of the regime's innovations -- essentially rests on the plurality of power centers. Wrongly presented by foreign observers as the source of chaos, even anarchy, this form of government is actually one of the guarantees of the continuity of the Shiite theocracy.

Actually, at the summit of government is the *faqih* (Footnote 1) (literal translation: doctor of dogma), whose duties and responsibilities now fall to Imam Ruhollah Khomeyni. According to Article 5 of the constitution, only a doctor of dogma, meaning a member of the Shiite clergy, "just, virtuous, in step with the evolution of the times, courageous, effective and shrewd, who is accepted as a guide by the majority of the people," can occupy this position (no article specifies how the "majority of the people" can express their choice). Again, according to the constitution, the duties of the faqih are defined as follows: He appoints half of the 12 members of the council to keep watch over the constitution, which must come from the Shiite clergy (Article 91); he names the highest judicial authorities in the country, also Shiite clerics (Article 162); and finally, he exercises supreme command of the Armed Forces, enjoying very extensive powers in this domain (Article 110). Candidacies for the presidency of the republic are first submitted for approval by the faqih, who has the right to revoke the chief of state, following a legal or parliamentary procedure of removal (Article 110), as was the case in June 1981 with Abol-Hassan Banisadr.

This Vigilance Council occupies the second-highest position in the hierarchy of government. Created to prevent Parliament from transgressing the "commandments of Islam and the constitution," it oversees laws and decrees passed by the deputies. In addition to the six members of the Shiite clergy appointed directly by Imam Khomeyni, the Vigilance Council is made up of six jurists "elected by Parliament from a lsit of Islamic jurists presented by the High Judicial Council."

But inasmuch as the latter is itself made up of five officials -- including two members of the Shiite clergy directly named by the faqih and the other three indirectly -- the Vigilance Council is actually only an extension of the power of Imam Khomeyni, his legislative control apparatus (Footnote 2) (Articles 4, 91 and 158 of the constitution). To date, this Council has demonstrated formidable efficiency, particularly by invalidating laws on the nationalization of foreign trade and those on agrarian reform.

At the base of the legislative system is the *madjless* (Parliament), whose role is reduced to legislating in terms of the guidelines defined by the higher bodies. Now made up of 270 deputies, two-thirds of whom are members of the Shiite clergy, the madjless is dominated by the Party of the Islamic Republic (PRI), the five deputies of the Iranian Liberation Movement of Mehdi Bazargan -- former prime minister of the provisional government instituted after the fall of the Shah -- having boycotted the last legislative elections in May 1984 to protest the absence of democracy from Iranian political life. The madjless has the right to accept or reject by a vote of confidence the prime minister and ministers to be presented to him by the president of the republic. Only the latter is elected by universal suffrage. Nevertheless, his power, like that of the government, is very limited.

According to the constitution, in fact, "executive power" is limited to the administrative management of the state. However, the presence within the administration of many Islamic associations exercising continual pressure on governmental bodies causes a permanent conflict between the different administrative and Islamic authorities, which has the effect of paralyzing government action almost totally.

At the same time, Islamic power rests on the organization of the *komiteh* (Footnote 3) (from the French word *comite*), whose essential function is to provide social control: From ration coupons for food to problems of housing or employment, the daily life of the Iranians is managed by the komiteh, which can maintain constant pressure on the rank and file, mainly through advantages arbitrarily granted to some, at the whim of political alliances made within the Shiite hierarchy.

Among the revolutionary organizations, the Djahad-e sazandegui (Footnote 4) ("holy war for construction") was originally one of the most popular. Initiated by the government of Bazargan in May 1979, which wanted to mobilize young people to develop the rural zones, the Djahad-e sazandegui rapidly recruited thousands of volunteers. They helped the villagers to build roads, schools and clinics and improve irrigation. They undertook countless projects and thus enabled the Islamic Republic to increase its influence within the Iranian peasantry. However, in order to prevent this organization from escaping the control of the Shiite clergy, the Djahad-e sazandegui was converted into a ministry in 1983. It immediately eliminated the volunteers, hired wage earners and became bureaucratized. To a certain extent, it is now in the rural areas what the komiteh are in the cities: a political organization structure.

According to the constitution, judicial power is an extension of religious power. The presiding judge of the Appeal Court, the attorney general, along with the members of the High Judicial Council must come from the Shiite clergy. In the absence of any new civil code and an "Islamic" penal code to replace those in force under the Shah, Iranian judicial decisions, when they do not concern political crimes, are based on an interpretation of Koranic writings and precepts. The rulings of the various Islamic courts therefore vary in terms of "Islamic morals" whose expression in legal terms is most arbitrary.

Army Within the Army

One of the most striking examples of the determination to increase the number of power centers is the policy followed by the regime with regard to the Armed Forces. When the Shah fell, in order to ensure military power, particularly for the purpose of countering that of the army, whose loyalty to the new regime was subject to caution, the Shiite clergy created the corps of the Guardians of the Revolution, the Pasdaran. A veritable Pretorian guard of the imam, recruiting from among the young whose devotion to the Islamic government is undeniable, this militia now has 250,000 men. And while that number corresponds precisely to the personnel of the Iranian Army, the latter has only 150,000 career soldiers, the rest being made up of conscripts.

Used from the time of its creation to put down leftist forces -- some of whose groups, such as the Fadayan-e khalq and the Modjahedine-e khalq , had also constituted powerful armed militias -- the corps of the Pasdaran has also waged most of the fighting against the Kurd autonomists. But it was their resistance to Baghdad's troops at the time of the invasion of Iraq in September 1980 that made them today's spearhead of the Iranian military offensives, even if their weaponry remains far inferior to that of the Regular Army. In

order to strengthen their power, Imam Khomeyni decided in September 1985 that the Pasdaran, headed by a ministry since 1982, would be given new air, naval and infantry units and that certain units of the Regular Army would be incorporated into them. Thus, while the strategy of division adopted by Imam Khomeyni toward political institutions succeeded in creating a "state within the state," applied to the Iranian military corps, it ended up by imposing an "army within the army" on it.

This determination to increase the number of decision-making poles also responds to security concerns. Actually, if the Iranian revolutionary forces, gathered around Imam Khomeyni, could so rapidly overthrow the Pahlavi regime, it was because it struck directly at the summit. In solely demanding the departure of the Shah, the Imam aimed to deprive the regime of its centripetal thrust. Deprived of its supreme command, the Imperial Army put up no resistance and the Pahlavi edifice collapsed almost without bloodshed. Today, with the centrifugal structure of the Islamic state, such a scenario is unworkable.

The effectiveness of the system was also demonstrated in June 1981 when a bombing attempt decimated nearly 80 dignitaries of the Islamic Republic. They included Ayatollah Behechti, head of the PRI and the No 2 man of the regime, four ministers, six deputy ministers and over 30 deputies. It was again demonstrated 2 months later when a new attack killed the president of the republic, Mohammad-Ali Radjai, and Prime Minister Mohammad-Djavad Bahonar. Even in the case of the disappearance of Imam Khomeyni, the control by 80,000 members of the Shiite clergy over the government machinery, the multiplicity of power centers, the elasticity of people's mobilization structures and finally, the breakup of the military apparatus seem to make the theocracy safe from any attempt at political destabilization. Under such conditions, how can it be that the future of the regime has never looked so gloomy?

Since the institution of the Islamic Republic, the dependency of the Iranian economy on its oil revenue has only grown until it is now almost total. The absence of any production other than that of the petroleum sector is compensated for by an exaggerated determination to import. Thus perpetuating the harmful policy inaugurated by the Pahlavi monarchy -- which gave priority to oil at the expense of the other sectors of national production -- the regime of Imam Khomeyni faces a deterioration of the economy that is accelerating with the drop in the price of oil (Footnote 5) (see Ahmad Faroughy, "The Collapse of the Iranian Economy," LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, December 1981).

According to the few figures made public by the government -- this discretion is partially explained by military secrecy in wartime -- during the last Iranian year (March 1985-February 1986), imports totaled $13.5 billion and nonpetroleum exports $500 million. According to Western statistics, Iranian imports from OECD countries amounted in 1985 to some $7.5 billion -- including $3.6 billion in purchases from the EEC -- and those from Eastern countries to some $2.5 billion. The total: over one-third of all government expenditures. In 1984, imports from OECD countries reportedly amounted to $9.7 billion (-ncluding $5.2 billion for the EEC) and, in 1983, to $12.2 billion (including $6.2 billion for the EEC) (Footnote 6) (STATISTIQUES MENSUELLES DU COMMERCE

EXTERIEUR, OECD, Paris, February 1986, and the IRNA (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY), 11 May 1986). But these figures express only part of the truth. In September 1985, the official daily KAYHAN concluded a study on the state of the national economy by noting that in 1983, imports from the West reportedly amounted to some $19 billion, over half of the government's spending.

Drop in Imports From Western Countries (in millions of dollars; monthly averages)

Principal Suppliers	1983	1984	1985
FRG	250.9	192.3	137.3
Japan	235.1	139.3	111.7
United Kingdom	79.6	78.3	56.8
Italy	75	79.2	50.6
Spain	34.1	24.4	23.6
Netherlands	35	31.2	23.04
Australia	19.6	31.2	17.8
Switzerland	--	23.4	16.2
Sweden	35.2	39.2	15.9
Belgium-Luxembourg	21.4	19.2	14.9
Austria	22.9	16.5	14.6
France	30.6	15.1	13.2

Source: OECD, "Monthly Foreign Trade Statistics," January-April 1986, Paris

Divisions Among Those in Power

Such a policy is beginning to be openly criticized by some Islamic leaders, but no measure has been taken to modify it. The budget for Iranian year 1365 (March 1986-February 1987) provides for some $40 billion in receipts, including $20 billion directly from oil revenue. However, the collapse in the price of oil (to half between December 1985 and March 1986) will not fail to have extremely serious consequences for the economy, especially since spending linked to the war -- put at $13.8 billion for the past year (Footnote 7) ("The Military Balance 1985-1986," International Institute of Strategic Studies, London) -- are always considered to have priority.

Whence, without a doubt, the growing tension manifested within the urban social corps, tension that is said to be a matter of serious concern to the Islamic government (Footnote 8 ("A Stumbling Economy Haunts Iran," INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 13 March 1986). The constant drop in agricultural production is causing a massive exodus of the peasantry to the cities, where the drop in industrial production has created massive unemployment. On the national scale, one out of two workers is without a job, meaning 6 million persons. This impoverishment of the economy is confirmed by the increase in food and basic industrial finished products in the structure of imports (Footnote 9) (see "Foreign Trade by Product," OECD, 1985). But the economic crisis also expresses the divisions existing among those in government. The partisans of untrammeled liberalism are grouped around Prime Minister Mir-Hosein Musavi-Khamenei, while those demanding the nationalization of the

private sector and a centralized economy rally behind the president of the republic, Ali Khamenei. This split came out in the open in October when a third of Parliament refused to extend a vote of confidence to the Musavi government, which has faced criticism for months from Khamenei's supporters. It took a speech by Imam Khomeyni on radio (Footnote 10) (Radio Tehran, 16 October 1985) calling for the "sacred union" to prevent "a failure of Islam" and condemning "Western-type parliamentary practices" to silence "factional ambitions" that nevertheless increasingly motivate the madjless.

While the presence of Imam Khomeyni tempers these rivalries within the governing clergy, the gravity of the economic problems could exacerbate the race to power given the prospect of its disappearance. On their solution depends the future of the Islamic Republic, for the social malaise, echoed daily in the Iranian press, could serve as a detonator for the enemies of the theocracy tempted to blow up a political structure that still remains solid.

Searching for Allies

Since the beginning of the Iraqi-Iranian war in September 1980, the diplomacy of the Islamic regime has constantly sought to reduce the support which Iraq enjoys from most nations. Iran's isolation is all the more felt at home because it was the Ba'thist leaders in power in Baghdad who instigated the hostilities by launching their troops on the conquest of Iranian territory (Footnote 11) (Ahmad Faroughy: "The War Between Iraq and Iran," LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, November 1982). The support granted to President Saddam Husayn or, at best, the silence of the international community in the face of the Iraqi attack, has helped radicalize the Islamic republic's foreign policy.

From the very beginning of the war, the Iranians have not failed to compare the ambiguous reactions of Westerners to the invasion of their country with the indignation roused by the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. This is all the more true because Western leaders labeled Muslim fundamentalists making up the Afghan resistance as "heroes" and those in Iran who defended themselves against other invaders -- allies of the USSR to boot -- as "obscurantists." For Imam Khomeyni, this paradox gave credit to the thesis of the "conspiracy hatched against the Islamic republic" and strengthened the argument of those within the regime who preached the exportation of the revolution.

In order to succeed, two obstacles had to be overcome. On the one hand, Iran is not part of the Arab world, from which it is separated by the ethnic origin of its population as well as its language. Nor have the leaders in Baghdad avoided, in their propaganda, taking "the defense of the Arab world against Persian imperialism," a slogan aimed at mobilizing Arab nationalism to its advantage (Footnote 12) (Idem.). Furthermore, Shiism is a minority within the Muslim world. Outside of Iran, most Shiites are in Iraq and Lebanon. In wartime, it was natural for Tehran to try first of all to win over to its cause the Shiite community in Iraq, which represents nearly half of that country's population.

Enemies of Our Enemies

If the Iraqi Shiite organizations were already structured well before the arrival of Imam Khomeyni in power, the latter would scarcely delay in strengthening them, both politically and militarily. Prompted by him, the Al-Dawa ("the call") movement, founded in Iraq during the 1950's in order to increase the power of the Shiite clergy, would thus experience an upsurge in activity. Militating for the establishment of an Islamic republic in Iraq, having a military branch and having publicly sworn allegiance to Imam Khomeyni, its enfeoffment to the Iranian regime would be total. Very active in Iraqi Shiite milieus, Al-Dawa has already claimed credit for numerous attacks army and the Ba'thist security forces. But while it seems to be the most important Shiite opposition organization of Iraq, it is nevertheless not the only one. Several movements -- all dissenting from Al-Dawa -- also enjoy the support of Tehran, where their general headquarters are located. Among them: the Organization of Islamic Action and Al-Modjahedine, both having claimed credit for numerous attacks in Iraq and abroad.

In November 1982, in order to coordinate the activities of these various rival movements, Tehran is encouraging the Iraqi Shiite clergy opposed to the regime in Baghdad to merge within the Supreme Council of the Iraqi Islamic revolution. Although this council has repeatedly manifested its will for unification, it is itself reportedly the prey of a struggle between two factions: one ready to recognize a certain role of the other Iraqi political forces; and the other a supporter of theocracy, following the example of the regime of Imam Khomeyni (Footnote 13) (see "The Islamic Renewal and Its Strategic Implications," National High Institute of Defense and Disarmament Studies, Paris 1985).

Also for the purpose of weakening President Husayn, Tehran is now helping Kurdish autonomists within the Democratic Party of the Iraqi Kurdistan (PDK). In addition to weapons, it allows the Barzani brothers -- sons of Mostafa Barzani, founder of the PDK -- to train their troops in Iranian military camps, particularly in the Urumiyeh region. In order to protect its oil deposits from the attacks of which they are regularly the target by Kurdish-Iranian forces, Baghdad is thus forced to open up a second front in the the north. However, everything leads one to believe that the alliance between the PDK and Tehran is only circumstantial: The combination of tribal and political hatred, which explains the many turnabouts of the different Kurdish movements, have already diminished the support of the PDK for the Islamic regime (Footnote 14) (LE MONDE, 3-4 November 1985).

Iran's support for the Iraqi Shiite clergy and the PDK scarcely seems to have endangered President Husayn. The expulsion of tens of thousands of Iranians from Iraq, the brutal repression of Shiite fundamentalist movements and the spectre of the Iraqi people of having to suffer an Iranian military occupation have enabled President Husayn to foil Tehran's attempts to overthrow his regime from the inside. Likewise, Baghdad's efforts to reach the Iranian regime have turned out to be ineffective.

From the very beginning of the war, President Husayn has tried to form alliances within the Iranian opposition. Except for Chapour Bakhtiar, the last of the Shah's prime ministers who used the airwaves of Radio Baghdad to wage a verbal fight against the Islamic republic, no movement was yet ready to commit itself to a regime whose avowed goal was the annexation of part of the national territory. Former President Banisadr and his future nephew, Masud Radjavi, head of the Mojahedin of the People (Modjahedine-e khalq) -- the Islamic far left -- had to flee to France before Baghdad would find a collaborator in the latter.

In January 1983, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Aziz and Radjavi signed a joint communique confirming their alliance and had proposals published to put an end to the war. From that time on and although the peace plan worked out by the two sides is clearly to the disadvantage of Iran, certain rumors point to important financial aid from Iraq to the Modjahedine-e khalq (Footnote 5) (see IRAN-LIBERATION, official organ of the Modjahedine-e khalq, No 195, and LE MONDE, 27 March 1986).

But, paradoxically enough, such aid would turn against the latter. Difficult to justify to the Iranian people, who are totally devoted to the fight against Iraqi invaders, it caused them to lose the meager popular support which they might otherwise enjoy. In addition, it hastened the departure of former President Banisadr and his allies on the National Council of the Resistance, which caused the breakup of that organization devoted to the unification of the Modjahedine-e khalq with other anticommunist and antimonarchic movements opposed to the theocracy of Imam Khomeyni.

Finally, like Tehran, Baghdad supports the Kurdish autonomists fighting the enemy regime, particularly the Democratic Party of the Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI). According to its secretary general, Abdelrahman Ghassemlou, that party maintains excellent relations with President Husayn, "for we have a common enemy and the same objective: destroying the Islamic regime in Tehran" (Footnote 16) (LE MONDE, 9 February 1985). The Iraqis therefore allow weapons and munitions that the Kurdish insurgents buy abroad to pass through their territory. It is difficult to estimate the military scope of the Kurdish resistance, but, according to the latter, the Islamic republic reportedly recently sent 200,000 men to fight in Kurdistan, which is said to have forced the PDKI to move from "direct to guerrilla warfare" (Footnote 17) (KURDISTAN D'IRAN, publication of the PDKI, No 12, February 1986).

Complex Interplay of the Great Powers

Having thus formed alliances within their respective oppositions, Baghdad and Tehran have also tried to gain outside support. While Moscow and Washington have, in their diplomacy, adopted a line of strict neutrality regarding the conflict, the same is not true of their military policy.

For the USSR, such a contradiction can be explained by the fact that, from the very beginning of hostilities, Iraqi arms were 80 percent of Soviet origin. Linked with Iraq since 1972 by a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance, Moscow has so far maintained its flow of supplies to Baghdad, while still

trying to begin a military rapprochement with Tehran. According to Western sources, in May 1981, a Soviet-Iranian agreement that was reportedly kept secret allegedly entrusted the training of the Pasdaran to the USSR, which is also said to have supplied a large quantity of weapons (Footnote 8) (JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY, 23 November 1985). According to these same sources, it was these deliveries, made through North Korea, that supposedly enabled Iran to mount its recent offensives on Iraqi territory. Thus, thanks to the military aid given to the two camps, the USSR reportedly reserves the right to intervene in possible peace negotiations.

Outside of this support, moderate, after all, Moscow has tried in vain to draw closer to Imam Khomeyni's regime. But since the fall of the Shah, confronting growing ideological and political hostility from the theocracy in power in Tehran, the Soviets have been unable to prevent the deterioration of their relations with Tehran (Footnote 19) (Ahmad Faroughy: "The USSR and the Iranian Revolution," LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, July 1980). These relations turned sour when Imam Khomeyni undertook to eliminate the Tudeh Party (pro-Soviet and communist). The USSR recently tried to forget this "incident" in order to normalize relations with its southern neighbor. Those efforts led to the visit to Tehran in February of Georgiy Kornienko, deputy minister of foreign affairs, the highest Soviet official to go to Iran since the fall of the Shah. However, according to the official daily of the Iranian regime, this visit scarcely had the anticipated success, mainly because of the "inflexibility" of the Iranian position on Soviet weapons deliveries to Iraq (Footnote 20) (DJOMHOURIYE-ESLAMI, 4 February 1986).

Unlike the USSR, the United States is absent from the field of battle, but omnipresent on the periphery. Restoring diplomatic relations with Baghdad only in the fall of 1984 and confronting Tehran's hostility, its policy on the two capitals is essentially aimed at preventing the conflict from extending to the southern portion of the Gulf. The American fleet regularly cruises near Iranian territorial waters so as to deter the Islamic regime from imposing restrictions on freedom of navigation, inasmuch as Washington has publicly warned Tehran repeatedly that it would resort to force if the Strait of Ormuz were blockaded. Furthermore, since 1980, four American AWAC planes, in constant touch with the Pentagon, have been operating in the Saudi air space.

As for the nations on the Gulf, they have always asserted their neutrality with respect to their powerful neighbors to the north, but Saudi Arabia nevertheless generously finances the Iraqi war budget, even if the amount of the aid -- estimated to total several billion dollars -- has never been made public. At the latest annual summit conference of the Council of Cooperation of the Gulf (CCG), held in Mascate in November 1985, the sovereigns of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates avoided condemning Iraq, which is nevertheless responsible for the intensification of the bombing of ships in international waters and whose charges were aimed at the Islamic republic. Having favored Iraq -- a member of the Arab League -- at the last two summit conferences, the CCG has reportedly made timid attempts to draw closer to Iran, especially since the military growth of that country is forcing member states to reconsider their relations with the two warring nations. They hope to play an important role in possible peace negotiations,

so as to make their rights prevail at the time of the new regional rebalancing that could not fail to follow.

On the other hand, far from the field of battle, most of the other Arab nations can afford the luxury of demonstrating nearly absolute solidarity with their Iraqi brothers.

Baghdad has gone from the Arab "front of rejection" to the "moderate" camp favoring a compromise with Israel. To seal that new alliance, the Iraqi president received President Hosni Mubarak, Egyptian chief of state, in March 1985, along with King Hussein of Jordan, who had come to express their solidarity in the face of the murderous offensives that have enabled the Iranians to get a foothold west of Tigre. In addition to their political support, Cairo and Amman have already supplied Baghdad with important aid. Having authorized the 10,000 Egyptian nationals residing in Iraq to sign up as volunteers in that country's army, President Mubarak has also sold the regime in Baghdad a large amount of weapons, estimated to total $3 billion last year. For its part, the Hashimite kingdom grants Iraq transit privileges via the Jordanian port of Akaba, to ship military and civilian products.

Alone in the Arab world, Libya and Syria give their political support to Iran, although it is relatively moderate. Libyan aid scarcely exceeds the bodies of the Arab League, where Colonel Qadhdhafi systematically tries to block resolutions favorable to Iraq. In contrast, given the hostility that has always marked relations between Syrian President Assad and President Hussein, Damascus' support is more substantial. In April 1982, Syria closed the oil pipeline that enabled Iraq to export its oil through the Mediterranean ports of Banias, Syria, and Tripoli, Lebanon. Having only the pipeline that connects Kirkuk with Dortyol in Turkey, Baghdad thus suffers major losses. The Cairo-Amman-Baghdad axis is therefore pitted against the Tripoli-Damascus-Tehran axis, the latter being clearly less profitable to Iran than is the former to Iraq.

For their part, the European countries have so far managed to avoid taking sides, maintaining excellent commercial relations with both camps. Only France, because of economic and political ties, has gradually given exclusive support to Iraq (Footnote 21) (see Paul-Marie de la Gorce, "Facing the Enemy Regimes," LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, April 1986). However, as soon as Jacques Chirac became prime minister, Paris tried to restore the balance in its relations with Tehran. The message sent by President Mitterrand to Iranian President Khamenei, hoping for a "normalization of relations between France and Iran," the trip to Tehran in mid April of Andre Ross, secretary general of the Quai d'Orsay, and the official visit of Iranian Deputy Prime Minister Ali Reza Moayeri to Paris have helped renew the dialogue between the two countries.

While President Hussein has managed to isolate Imam Khomeyni's regime on the international scene, will the progress of Iranian Armed Forces in Iraqi territory incite nations to reconsider their relations with the two warring parties? Whatever the case, that is what the government in Tehran thinks. Speaking to the French leaders, but to those of other nations as well, the Iranian

prime minister stated: "We reminded them that on the day when they defined that policy, the Iraqis were in Khorramchahr, Iran. But today, it is the Iranian forces that occupy Fao, Iraq" (Footnote 22) (statements by Iranian Prime Minister Musavi on Radio Tehran, 13 April 1986). In other words, "Woe to the conquered."

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BRIEFS

PASSENGERS NOT OBSERVING VEIL--Those Iranian passengers who are going or returning from abroad are required to observe Islamic veil, otherwise they will be duly identified and in addition to not being permitted to leave the country, they will be prosecuted by law. At a meeting which was held in Tehran's public court and which was attended by Messieurs Mir Emadi, Tehran's public prosecutor, Tehrani, in charge of the State General Office for prohibiting unlawful deeds, Engineer Shafti, executive director of the Islamic Republic Airlines, commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps headquartered at the Mehrabad Airport, commander of the airport police and A'in-pour, supervisor of the Airport's Public Court, certain decisions were made as regards the proper method of combating the recurrence of unlawful deeds and other pertinent necessary collaborations between various organs. According to the report of the news department of Tehran's public prosecutor office at this meeting its was decided to allow the pertinent government officials to properly identify those individuals who do not observe complete Islamic veil and do not let them leave the country. Subsequently, such lawbreakers ought to be handed over to the public court of the airport for legal prosecution. [Text] [Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 2 Jun 86 p 2] 12719

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